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Abstract: This paper uses the systems of provision (sop) approach to explore the
role of finance in the delivery of water and sewerage in England and Wales. Since
privatization of the ten water and sewerage companies in 1989, the nature of private
ownership, and its engagement in the sector have evolved. Initially listed on the
stock exchange, with shares allocated to customers and the general public,
ownership has now become consolidated. Only three of the ten firms remain listed.
Four are in the hands of private equity, owned by global financial investors. Two are
owned by Asian infrastructure conglomerates, and one is owned by a not-for-profit
company.
In contrast to mainstream economics, the sop framework sees sector outcomes in
terms of relations between agents, embedded in historically evolved structures and
processes. Rather than perceiving consumption patterns to be the result of
independent decisions made by atomistic individuals, the sop approach considers
consumption to be linked to production as part of a vertically integrated process. As
a result, each sop is different and depends on the commodity or service in question
and the context in which provision is located. Water has specific material properties
which affect its delivery and which also impact on the way in which consumers
engage with producers. When the wider historical, political, geographical and socio-
economic context is added to the mix, this creates a sop that is unique to the delivery
of water in England and Wales.
Applying the sop approach shows that relations between agents are contested in the
sector, with the interests of private shareholders diverging from those of end users
in important respects. The state has the role of mediating these competing
priorities, largely through the regulator, Ofwat. However, the state itself has a
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specific, if evolving, political agenda which feeds into policy making. Locating finance
- both for production and consumption - in the context of the interplay of these
divergent interests provides a deeper understanding of how specific outcomes
emerge.
The paper shows that the water sector is heavily financialised and that global
financial capital is deeply embedded in production processes. Financialisation has in
some cases created opaque financial structures and secured high returns for
producers. Innovative securitisation procedures, via off-shore jurisdictions have
enabled some companies to raise gearing to levels unanticipated in the last price
review process in 2009, and unimaginable at the time of privatisation. Shareholder
distributions appear to be boosted by complex transactions across extensive
corporate group structures.
At the other end of the scale, the sector is financed by payments of customer bills.
Since privatisation, prices have risen substantially and a growing proportion of
households is struggling to pay their bills (although consumers have benefitted from
substantial capital investment). Furthermore, regressive outcomes result not just
from transfers from consumers to investors, but also from the rise in the proportion
of turnover allocated to rentier incomes. In contrast, the share of income allocated
to wage labour has declined over the past twenty years.
The state prioritises regulatory stability in order to continue to attract private
investors to finance the country’s infrastructure more generally. Hence, the sop is
shaped by the needs of investors. Measures to support low-income households are
small in relation to the financial returns. Things are changing in the sector. The
current price review (PR14) looks set to be more demanding on water companies
than previously. The recent water White Paper will require firms to separate their
retail and wholesale activities in anticipation of greater competition.. However, for
these measures to make a significant dent in the structural inequality of the sop,
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investors will need to see their revenues fall, in which case they may decide they can
make higher returns elsewhere.
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1 Introduction
This paper applies the systems of provision (sop) approach to the delivery of water
and sewerage in England and Wales1 building on an earlier paper on sops.2 Water in
1 The study originally aimed to encompass all the countries of the UK but the water delivery systems
in Northern Ireland and Scotland are completely separate and run along different lines to those of
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these countries was privatised in 1989, and the sector is widely understood in terms
of a market – albeit a highly imperfect one. Sector policy is largely oriented around
making the structure as market-like as possible. The regulatory framework is
intended to mimic the incentives and constraints that monopolistic companies would
face if they were under competitive pressure. The sector is seen as deviating from an
idealised state.
The sop approach, in contrast, interprets the sector in terms of the way in which
agents relate to each other and, as such, is based in the real world. Rather than
seeing the delivery of water as a market that needs to be corrected, the sop
approach starts from the premise that outcomes emerge from settlements between
agents which are themselves embedded in historically evolved social and economic
structures and processes. The sop also derives from the material properties and
cultural associations attached to specific goods and services. One of the key
principles of the sop approach is that consumption is not the spontaneous outcome
of decisions made by rational individuals but is inherently linked to the production
process. Agents have different, and often competing, interests. Settlements are
highly contested. Contestation among agents leads to continually evolving outcomes
which result from the interplay of various factors including vested interests,
bargaining positions and government policy, all of which are embedded in a specific
context. Contestation may take the form of formal negotiation, for example, in the
rounds of the price-setting process between the regulator and water companies.
However, much of the contested space lies outside the realms of the formal
regulatory framework. For the sop approach, what is not regulated is as important
as what is. Furthermore, the regulatory machinery does not just set the rules for the
firms involved in water delivery but also shapes the ethos of the sector which
impacts on all stakeholders.
England and Wales. Both Northern Ireland Water and Scottish Water are publicly owned and were
never privatised.
2 Bayliss, Fine and Robertson (2013), “From Financialisation to Consumption: The Systems of
Provision Approach Applied to Housing and Water” FESSUD Working Paper No 2.
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In the delivery of water in the UK, the primary agents are consumers, producers and
the state. However, within these groupings, there are different agents which
themselves have different and possibly conflicting incentives and interests. The
private water companies consist of the owners and financiers (which are often based
offshore), the company directors and the workforce. The state is mainly represented
by the economic regulator, Ofwat, but also includes other regulatory agencies, such
as the Environment Agency and the Competition Commission. Furthermore, the
state is involved in the sop in a more general sense. Water tariffs and company
profits are potentially politically charged. In addition, the current Government’s aim
to increase private sector financing for infrastructure requires such investments to
be profitable for investors. Other state institutional structures also shape the sop for
water such as company law, labour law and the tax regime
There are also secondary agents that are involved in the supply chain for water such
as legal, financial and management consultants. In addition, most of the
construction work in the sector is sub-contracted to construction firms. The
secondary agents are not covered in detail in this study.
While the production side incorporates a confined set of agents, everyone consumes
water. Consumers are a vast and disparate group including households and
industrial and agricultural users. For most consumers, there is little awareness of
the way that the water system is managed. Supply is monopolistic and the issues are
technically complex. Consumers have no option but to pay their water bills. Although
investment choices are influenced by trends in consumption, individual domestic
consumers have little direct influence over what and how much infrastructure is
built. Consumers have to rely on government and regulators to protect their
interests (NAO 2013b). Recent developments to strengthen consumer involvement
(through the establishment of the Consumer Council for Water (CCW) and Customer
Challenge Groups (CCGs)) have been at the behest of the state.
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This study, which is part of the FESSUD programme of research,3 focuses on finance
and financialisation in the delivery of water and sewerage4 in England and Wales.
The past few decades have seen a transformation in the way that water is provided.
Once treated as a local public service, it is now considered to be a commodity with
economic value. Initially privatised with a view to raising investment finance, the
sector has become increasingly financialised with the financial sector and financial
practices now playing a core role in the sop. Some firms are owned by financial
institutions, and shareholder distributions appear to be boosted by complex
transactions across extensive corporate group structures.
With no formal state subsidy, the sector is virtually entirely reliant on payments from
end users. Adopting the sop framework, this study connects finance for production
(capital investment finance) with consumption finance (water bills paid by end users)
treating these as part of the same process. This sector-wide approach is intended to
provide an overview of the flow of funds with a view to understanding the
distributional outcomes from the sop. The paper shows that, the nature of ownership
of water has shifted since privatisation, and some water companies have become
assets of global financial conglomerates, including pension and investment funds,
with some operating on behalf of “high net worth individuals.” Over the past decade,
stakes in water companies have generated handsome returns for these investors as
a result of generous regulatory terms combined with financial restructuring with
high leverage and complex financial transactions, in line with wider financialisation
practices. In addition, payments to directors have escalated while the share of
income going to labour has declined. At the other end of the sop, consumers have
benefitted from substantial investment in the sector, and most have access to good
quality water. However, prices have risen substantially and a growing proportion of
3 “Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development”. For more information see
fessud.eu
4 Occasionally reference is made to “water” rather than “water and sewerage.”
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customers is struggling to pay their bills. This system is mediated by the regulator,
Ofwat, whose operations do little to address the complexities of international
finance.
The sop analysis shows that the current settlement is regressive with customers
financing distributions to shareholders on top of the cost of service delivery. In
addition the system lacks accountability. The identity of the ultimate investors can be
difficult to trace. The basis on which dividend and interest payments are made, both
externally and within complex group structures, is not disclosed. The paper brings
out several ways in which the state is supporting these inequitable outcomes, both in
terms of practice and in creating an ethos that promotes inequality. Distributions to
finance, in the form of interest payments and dividends, have been allowed to grow
unchecked while cuts in employment costs are encouraged in the name of increased
efficiency. Tax avoidance practices are unchallenged. Price settlements have been
generous to firms at the expense of customers. Censure is heavy on those that fail to
pay their water bills while growing extraction of revenue on the part of the financial
sector has been tolerated and even encouraged in the name of market outcomes.
The paper consists of two parts. The first part sets out the history and the current
structure of the sop (section 2), outlining the way in which production is organised
(section 3) and the relationship between firms and the economic regulator, Ofwat
(section 4). The second part provides a sop interpretation of the sector looking at the
relations between agents in the regulatory process (section 5) before considering the
role of finance in production (section 6). This is supported with an analysis of the
changing financial structure of water companies (section 7). The paper then turns to
the role of end users in financing the sector (section 8) before the final section
concludes showing that, while considerable investment has ensured that end users
have access to a regular supply of good quality water, private ownership in the
context of financialisation has led to a structure that is increasingly inequitable.
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2 Background and context
A system of provision (sop) derives from the material and cultural properties of the
commodity or service in question as well as the wider context. This section sets out
some of the key elements of the background to the sop analysis with an overview of
the nature of water, the wider context of financialisation and the main consumers of
water before a review of the history of the sector.
Water is essential for life and is a vital input into agriculture, energy production and
many industrial processes although the relative allocations will vary over time and
across locations. As a result there is a strong social and political dimension to
delivery systems. Water is heavy to transport and tends to be consumed near to
where it is produced. It is usually carried via networks of pipes and pumps. Delivery
is largely monopolistic as duplication would be costly. Water use is closely linked to
the state of the ecosystem. There are environmental benefits to be gained from
lowering water consumption The way in which water and sanitation are provided can
be technically complex. In the UK, where virtually all households have access to a
secure and safe supply of water, most consumers have little knowledge of, nor
interest in, the details of the way it is delivered. In countries with major water
scarcity there is likely to be considerably more consumer awareness and
involvement in the sop.
From a financial point of view, infrastructure assets can be attractive to investors as
they provide a stable, long-term investment. They usually involve long-life high-
value physical assets which create a barrier to entry and the nature of the sector is
such that there is little probability that technological advances will render the assets
obsolete (RiskMetrics 2008). The sector is tightly regulated and returns tend to be
highly predictable for years ahead. In the privatised system in England and Wales,
this financing structure has lent itself to particular forms of financing and
securitisation. This is one of the ways in which the sector has become financialised.
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Financialisation refers to a phenomenon that has occurred worldwide if primarily in
Europe and the USA over the past three decades where financial markets,
institutions and elites have gained greater influence over economic policy and
outcomes, and where profits accrue through financial channels rather than trade
and commodity production (Epstein 2002; Palley 2007). Other features of the process
include the rapid expansion of financial activity relative to real activity and financial
profits making up an increasing share of total profits (Stockhammer 2010).
Ownership of non-financial firms is increasingly in the hands of financial investors.
Short-term share price movements take priority over the long-term success of the
firm leading to cost cutting and job reductions. Stock options are used to align the
interests of managers with those of shareholders (Rossman and Greenfield 2006).
Financialisation is associated with increased inequality. Rentier incomes (interest,
dividends and capital gains) and financial sector bonuses have increased while wage
shares have fallen (Stockhammer 2010; Rodriguez and Jayadev 2010). The state has
supported the emergence of the rentier class with policies that are in their interest
(Jayadev and Epstein 2007). While financialisation is increasingly impacting on every
day lives through pensions, insurance and financial services, the role of finance in
the delivery water is more opaque (Allen and Pryke 2013). Most consumers of water
in England and Wales are unaware of the heavily financialised structure behind the
service.
2.1 Consumption
Water consumption is shaped by the nature of the consumers. Industrial and
agricultural consumers engage on different terms. Some consumers, such as
energy producers, access water outside the public water supply system. These are
beyond the scope of this paper which focuses on both finance and financialisation. A
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sop analysis with a different focus, for example, looking at environmental issues may
include wider aspects of consumption.
In 2006-07, about half of the 12.7 billion cubic metres of water abstracted in England
and Wales was for public water supply with the remainder largely accounted for in
cooling uses by electricity generation and in agriculture. See Fig 1.
Fig 1: Licensed abstractions in England and Wales
Source: DEFRA 2008
About 6.5bn m3 of water was directly abstracted for use by businesses.5 These get
their water from rivers or the ground without going through the treatment works and
public distribution system of the public water supply. This is used by industry, power
generation and farming which does not require high quality water. Direct abstraction
requires a licence from the Environment Agency (DEFRA 2008).
5
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130123162956/http:/www.defra.gov.uk/statistics/environ
ment/green-economy/scptb10-wateruse/
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Fig 2: Public water supply, England and Wales (ml and %)
Source: DEFRA 2008
Of the water that goes through the public water supply system, just over half is for
household use, 23% for non-households, and 17% is lost through leakage (Fig 2).
Household water demand has been increasing since the 1950s due to population
growth and changes in the way water is used in the home. On average, families use
500 litres of water a day. This is almost 50% more than 25 years ago, and the
increase is attributed to changes in culture and technology. For example, more
households have power showers and household appliances such as washing
machines.6
Meanwhile, public water supply usage by industrial and commercial sectors has
been declining. This is partly due to the changing nature of UK industry (DEFRA
2008) but also because more water consumption is outsourced in part due to global
trade and improvements in international shipping. About 62% of the total UK national
“water footprint” (i.e. the total water consumption embedded in the production of
other consumption goods) is accounted for by water from other countries while only
6 http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/beinggreen/117266.aspx
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38% is used from domestic water resources.7 Agriculture uses only 1% of the water
resources in the UK but there are substantial seasonal and regional variations. In
East Anglia, agriculture uses 16% of abstracted water, and from some rivers all the
water abstracted is for agriculture (DEFRA 2008).
2.2 Background
Water delivery systems vary across regions and countries. The prevailing sop is the
result of decades of evolving practices combined with political and social
imperatives: “Contemporary water networks reflect historical choices and practices.
There is thus nothing ‘natural’ about how and where contemporary water networks
in England and Wales are found” (Bakker 2007 p. 43). In the UK, water delivery was
initially carried out by private providers but these became consolidated into public
municipal systems towards the end of the 19th century. Private provision was found to
have limitations including a bias towards wealthy consumers, high price and
undersupply. In addition, greater awareness of the health impact of poor sanitation
led to public investment in sewerage across the country. By the early 20th Century,
around 80% of service delivery was carried out by the public sector (Bakker 2010).
Management of the sector became increasingly centralised with a strong emphasis
on engineering. In 1963 the Water Resources Act established the Water Resources
Board (WRB) to advise on the planning of the conservation and redistribution of
water on a national scale. The emphasis was on large-scale schemes, based on top-
down planning. The senior staff of the WRB was dominated by engineers and this
shaped the approach: “The absence from the Board of a biologist or an economist
allowed the development of technocratic plans untrammelled by ecological doubts
or much consideration of economics. Protected from interference from above,
together with its distance from local politics, the WRB seized the opportunity for
7 www.waterfootprint.org
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water planning on a grander scale than had ever been contemplated before in
England and Wales” (McCulloch 2009, p.467).
The approach of the WRB was to move water around to where it was needed rather
than to adapt water use to availability. In stark contrast to today’s philosophy, the
use of price signals to limit demand was not considered to be a viable option: “price
is unlikely to limit demand for water overall” (WRB 1969, cited in McCulloch 2009,
p.470). A later criticism of the WRB was the lack of economic management with, for
example, forecasts based on simple projections of population growth and
expectations that demand from industry would continue to increase at rates
experienced in the previous thirty years (Ofwat Defra 2006). The WRB failed to
anticipate a dramatic decline in industrial water demand as the country shifted from
being a major manufacturing economy with the growth of service industries and a
population shift to the water-scarce South East. According to McCulloch (2009, p.
471): “the planning overshoots fuelled demands to divest and privatise water
resources when the political context changed.”
The 1973 Water Act disbanded the WRB, and ten regional water authorities were
created that took over the functions of the water undertakers, sewerage and sewage
disposal authorities, and the River Authorities. Before the 1973 Act, water authority
revenue was not ring-fenced, and income from water could be absorbed in the
general local authority budget. From 1973 water authorities were obliged to operate
on a cost-recovery basis to ensure charges met revenue requirements. Investment
came under the control of local government. But the 1973 Act gave central
government considerable influence over the levels of capital investment with a duty
to examine and approve the water authorities plans and programmes (Ofwat Defra
2006)
Capital to meet investment requirements could now be raised by borrowing from
central government and revenue from customers. After the 1974 restructuring of the
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water sector, the industry was heavily indebted but, with wider economic concerns at
the time, including high inflation, government was reluctant to fund capital
investment. A subsequent Water Act in 1983 reduced the role of local government in
decision making and allowed water authorities to borrow from private capital
markets rather than solely from central government. These changes shaped the
sector that was privatised.
Following the election of the Thatcher-led Conservative Government in 1979, a
large-scale privatisation programme was introduced. According to Kay and
Thompson (1986) there had been long-running frustration with publicly-owned
companies. A common theme of policy reform in the years leading up to privatisation
was the need for a greater emphasis on commercial rather than public interest
considerations and the introduction of more extensive financial controls. Sir Ian
Byatt who was Head of the Public Sector Economic Unit and Deputy Chief Economic
Adviser in HM Treasury in the 1980s, describes a pre-privatisation era of inefficient
nationalized industries captured by strong trade unions with soft budget constraints
(Byatt 2007).
Privatization shifted public utilities off the government books to private balance
sheets. Market incentives were expected to generate efficiency and innovation. There
was also a direct political agenda to break the power of trade unions and to create a
new class of Conservative voters that were shareowners (Helm and Tindall 2009).
Even with monopolistic structures as with water, competition in the capital market
was expected to stimulate competitive forces (Ofwat Defra 2006 p.31).
Privatisation was also associated with a deeper cultural shift and a reduction in the
share of the government in the economy (Helm 2005). For Thatcher, the policy was
instrumental in reforming the socio-economic order of the country. David Parker
(2004) cites her memoirs:
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Privatization ... was fundamental to improving Britain’s economic
performance. But for me it was also far more than that: it was one of the
central means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting effects of socialism
... Just as nationalization was at the heart of the collectivist programme by
which Labour Governments sought to remodel British society, so privatization
is at the centre of any programme of reclaiming territory for freedom
(Thatcher, 1993, p.676 - cited in Parker 2004, p. 3).
There was no master plan. Rather, privatisation evolved incrementally as each
successive sale took place (Parker 2004). After British Telecom was privatised in
1984 and British Gas in 1986, attention turned to the water sector: “With government
unwilling to fund the increased investment requirements either from increases in
taxes or increasing borrowing and with its broader programme of privatisation of
utilities underway, the government started to consider the privatisation of the
industry” (Ofwat Defra 2006, p.29). According to Helm (2005) the objectives behind
privatising the water industry included increased efficiency, widening share
ownership and greater investment. He considers the investment requirements to be
the greatest motivation as well as the desire to use private rather than public
borrowing to raise investment finance.
Proposals for water privatisation were published in 1986 when a Department of the
Environment (DoE) White Paper initially proposed that water authorities would
become private without changes to their powers or responsibilities. Following the
lead from British Telecom, regulation of the water sector was to take the form of
price controls (also known as incentive-based regulation) where prices are set for a
five-year period and are allowed to increase by the rate of inflation (as measured by
the retail price index (RPI)) adjusted by a factor (X) to account for various elements
including investment costs, efficiency gains etc. Within that price boundary, firms
have an incentive to lower costs as they benefit financially from greater profit. A
fixed-price contract was intended to provide incentives for companies to maximise
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profits and minimise costs in the same way as a normal price-taking company would
in a competitive market (Helm 2005). This was expected to provide stronger
efficiency incentives than the rate-of-return regulation which had been adopted in
the USA (Ofwat Defra 2006).
Privatisation took place under the 1989 Water Act, and the ten water and sewerage
companies (WaSCs) were floated on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). To make up
for years of under-investment and to ensure that shares would be attractive to
investors, the Government cancelled all of the long-term debt owed by water and
sewerage companies at a total cost of £4.9bn. In addition, a cash injection of £1.5bn
(1989 prices) was provided to the water and sewerage companies, known as the
“green dowry” (Ofwat Defra 2006) so the level of gearing (i.e. the ratio of debt to
equity) was initially negative (Helm and Tindall 2009). Total proceeds from
privatization were £7.6bn. After privatization costs, the green dowry and the debt
write off, the benefits to the taxpayer were zero (Ofwat Defra 2006).
Every effort was made to ensure that the privatization was a success. Debt was
written off, the share price was low and the capital valuation was a fraction of its
actual value.8 As a result, the value of shares appreciated rapidly. At close of
business on the day trading began,9 the average share price was £2.80 representing
an average premium of 8.7%. In the months following flotation, water shares
continued to outperform the FTSE All Share Index, moving to a premium in excess of
20% by the end of January 1990 (Ofwat Defra 2006). For the first five years, prices set
8 At privatization the net replacement cost of the water industry was about £120bn (on the basis of the
Modern Equivalent Asset – MEA – which is the cost of replacing an existing asset with a technically up
to date new asset with the same service capability, adjusted for accumulated current cost
depreciation) while the privatization proceeds were about £6bn. So the valuation of capital (on which
all subsequent estimates have been derived) is based on a fraction (around 5%) of the actual value at
privatisation. In part this was to avoid price shocks. Post-privatization prices had to be based on their
pre-privatisation levels. According to Moody’s (2010, p.19), “The pre-privatisation prices implied a
valuation for the regulated businesses significantly lower than the replacement value of their assets.”
This meant that the level of prices would not yield sufficient revenue to replace the assets (Helm
2005).
9 12th December 1989.
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by the terms of the privatisation produced a real return in excess of 12% pa. This
was seen as too generous and a windfall tax was imposed on privatized utilities in
1997 following a change of government.
Privatisation at first created a largely dispersed set of owners who had been
encouraged to buy shares in the companies. Preference was given to water
companies’ customers and the final allocation led to around 44% of shares being
allocated to the general public. At first, the Government retained a ‘golden share’ in
each company to prevent any individual or single company from controlling more
than 15% of voting shareholdings (Helm and Tindall 2009). The initial ownership
structure was, however, always meant to be temporary. When the golden share was
sold in 1994, concentration of ownership started almost immediately. Water
companies were targets for takeovers with their large cash balances, low levels of
debt and high and secure revenues.
Helm and Tindall (2009) document the early stages of international takeovers in the
water and energy sectors with the arrival of American and then European
infrastructure firms. This was followed by a further stage with the introduction of
private equity and infrastructure funds. These have specialized in short-term
financial engineering, replacing equity with debt, discussed in more detail below.
Today the policy framework continues to evolve. The sector has been under review in
the past few years to address climate change and population growth and is part of a
wider initiative to strengthen national infrastructure. In 2010, Infrastructure UK was
established as a unit within the Treasury to coordinate planning of infrastructure
investment in the country. The first National Infrastructure Plan was published in
October 2010 and updated in November 2011 with a progress update in 2012
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together with associated ‘pipelines’ of expected infrastructure projects (NAO 2013a).
The aim is to develop a long-term coordinated approach to infrastructure planning. 10
For water, the Government states its commitment to “maintaining the security and
performance of the water and sewerage system while reducing its environmental
impacts” (HM Treasury 2011, p.6). Total required spending on infrastructure in the
2011 paper was estimated to be around £250bn of which around £21bn is required in
water. About two-thirds of total investment in the overall infrastructure plan is
intended to be privately funded. However, for the water sector, 100% of investment is
privately financed (HM Treasury 2011). The Government states it aim to use “all the
tools at its disposal to facilitate the private investment that will finance the majority
of the UK’s infrastructure” (HM Treasury 2011, p.5).
In addition to increasing private investment in the sector as well as other
infrastructures, the Government is planning further restructuring. In 2011 the Water
White Paper, Water for Life, was published by DEFRA, outlining the sector strategy
and key challenges faced with depleting supplies in some parts of the country.11 The
White Paper built on recommendations put forward in a Report by Martin Cave (the
Cave Review, 2009) to increase the role of competition in the sector. In July 2012 a
Draft Water Bill was issued, taking forward the market reforms outlined in the White
Paper, particularly those relating to increasing competition.12 From 2017, business
customers in England and Wales will be able to choose their supplier. To a large
extent this is based on the model of retail competition in Scotland (although the
Scottish wholesale production structure is very different from that of England and
Wales, with water production in the hands of a single public company, Scottish
Water).13
10 All documents relating to the Government’s national infrastructure plan can be found here:
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-infrastructure-plan
11 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm82/8230/8230.pdf
12 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm83/8375/8375.pdf
13 Interview, WICS, November 2013
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3 Production
The ten water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales are shown in
Fig. 3. In addition there are also several water-only companies operating, but these
are not covered in this analysis. In England the companies are privately owned.
Welsh Water (Dwr Cymru) was initially privatised along with the other companies but
has since been established as a not-for-profit company. Scottish Water and
Northern Ireland Water have always been, and continue to be, in public ownership.
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Fig 3: UK Water and Sewerage Companies
Source: WaterUK
3.1 Water company ownership structures
For the ten WaSCs, ownership structure can be grouped into four types:
1. Listed companies: United Utilities, Severn Trent, and Pennon which owns
South West Water.
2. De-listed companies owned by infrastructure firms: Wessex Water and
Northumbrian Water
3. De-listed companies owned by financial companies: Thames Water, Southern
Water, Anglian Water and Yorkshire Water
4. Not-for-profit company: Welsh Water (Dwr Cymru)
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In each case, the licensed water and sewerage provider is situated within a wider
corporate group of companies. Annexes 1 to 4 show the ownership structure of each
of these companies with the regulated provider shown in bold type and date of
incorporation shown in parentheses. The corporate structure for these companies
was traced by obtaining accounts for each company from the central register of
company information at Companies House.14 Some structures are more complex
than others. The nature of the different types of ownership is now outlined in more
detail.
3.1.1 Listed companies
Three companies remain listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Mostly their
owners are institutional investors. For example, more than 95% of Severn Trent
shares are owned by financial institutions including insurance companies, nominee
companies, banks, pension funds other corporate bodies, limited and public
companies.15 Some of the largest investors have a stake in more than one water
utility. For example, Blackrock Inc has a major stake in Severn Trent and United
Utilities. Pictet Asset Management and Legal and General and AXA also feature
among the major shareholders in more than one company (although these
shareholdings are not large – in the region of 5 to 10%).
Blackrock describes itself as an investment fund manager providing a range of
financial products and services whose clients include pension funds and insurance
companies.16 Stakes in these water companies feature in financial products. For
example, BlackRock EcoSolutions Investment Trust is described as a “diversified,
closed-in management investment company incorporated in the USA. The Trust’s
14 http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk There may be additional companies in the structures outlined
in the Annexes, as many have dormant companies and some have created new subsidiaries such as
Thames Water Commercial Ventures Finance Ltd, Thames Water Commercial Ventures Holdings Ltd
established in November 2013.
15 http://www.severntrent.com/investors/shareholder-centre/shareholding-analysis
16 www.blackrock.co.uk
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investment objective is to provide total return. The Trust invests at least 80% of its
assets in equity securities issued by companies that are engaged in one or more
sectors such as new energy, water resources and agriculture business segments.”17
This fund has stakes in water companies such as Manila Water Co Inc and in Severn
Trent Plc.
Similarly the Pictet Water Fund “invests worldwide in companies that are involved in
the water cycle, following a selective bottom-up stock selection process.” The
company reports that “Combining strong growth securities (water technology and
environmental services) with more valuation-oriented securities (water utilities and
packaged water) is in our view the best approach to produce a good balance between
risk and potential reward.”18 This fund has a stake in Pennon Group Plc which
accounts for 3.53% of the fund’s holdings and therefore ranks in the top ten holdings
of the fund.
3.1.2 De-listed – infrastructure companies
Two water companies are now part of international infrastructure conglomerates,
headquartered in Asia. These companies are referred to in the rest of this paper as
infrastructure-owned companies. Wessex Water was bought by Malaysian YTL
Corporation in 2002 for £1.2bn ($1.8bn).19 YTL is one of the largest companies listed
on the Malaysia Stock Exchange. YTL Corporation carries out its utilities activities
through its subsidiary YTL Power International Berhad (YTLPI). The company has
utility investments in Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore. The investment
in Wessex Water was YTL’s first foray into Europe and its first water investment. The
company’s other utility investments are in the energy sector. 20 YTL also has
investments in property development, construction and tourism. The founder, Yeoh
17 http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/BQR:US
18 http://www.blueandgreeninvestor.com/library/fundview/CHP4/Pictet%20Water
19 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1893736.stm
20 http://www.ytl.com/utilities.asp
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Tiong Lay, has a net worth of $2.8bn and is ranked number 503 in the world’s
richest.21
Northumbrian Water was bought by Hong Kong-based Cheung Kong Infrastructure
Holdings Ltd (CKI) and the Li Ka Shing Foundation in 2011. CKI has investments in
the UK energy sector (UK Power Networks Holdings Ltd, Northern Gas Networks
Ltd, Wales and West Utilities Ltd, Seabank Power Ltd) and in the water sector with a
small (4.75%) stake in Southern Water Services Ltd. CKI also has infrastructure
investments in the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and China. The
ultimate parent is Cheung Kong Holdings which is controlled by Li Ka Shing who is
cited by Forbes as the eighth richest person in the world with a net worth of
$34.7bn.22 Mr Li’s other investments in the UK include Felixstowe Port, 3 UK
telecoms group and Superdrug, a health and beauty retail chain.23
3.1.3 De-listed - owned by financial sector
Thames Water, Southern Water, Anglian Water and Yorkshire Water are owned by
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) put together by private financial investors. Mostly
the owners of these companies are investment fund managers and pension funds as
follows:
Yorkshire Water’s ultimate parent company is Kelda Holdings Ltd, registered in
Jersey. The owners of Kelda are Citi Infrastructure Investors (CII) (37.15%), which
manages Citi Infrastructure Partners (CIP), described as “a multi-billion
infrastructure fund that has controlling interests in mature transportation and utility
infrastructure assets;”24 GIC, the private equity investment arm of the Government of
21 http://www.forbes.com/profile/yeoh-tiong-lay/
22 http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/
23 “HK tycoon sees land of opportunity” Financial Times, 10 August 2012
24 www.citicapitaladvisors.com/ciiOverview.do
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Singapore Investment Corporation (26.32%); M&G Infracapital Investments, part of
M&G Investments, investment managers and owned by Prudential Plc (13.15%) and
Reef, the infrastructure asset management business within Deutsche Asset
Management in Deutsche Bank (23.27%).25
Anglian Water’s parent company is Anglian Water Group Ltd which is registered in
Jersey and owned by Colonial First State Global Asset Management (the
consolidated asset management division of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia
Group) with 32.2%; the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) Investment Board with 32.9%;
Industry Funds Management (IFM) (a global asset manager owned by 30 Australian
pensions funds specialising in infrastructure, private equity, debt investments and
listed equity) with 19.8% and 3i, (an international investor focusing on private equity,
infrastructure and debt management) with 15%.26
Thames Water’s ultimate parent company is Kemble Water Holdings Ltd which is
owned by a consortium of investors led by Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund
II LP (MEIF 2). This is one of four wholesale European investment funds owned by the
Australian Macquarie Group which describes itself as a “global provider of banking,
financial, advisory, investment and funds management services.”27 The Company’s
other shareholders are international pension funds and institutional investors but
these are not listed in the company accounts. Ofwat (2007a) provides a list of the
owners and brief profile of each at the time of the takeover. The list includes
Australian and Dutch pension funds, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand
investment fund managers, Finpro, a Portuguese holding company and Santander. In
2011, Macquarie sold a 9.9% stake to a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority.28 In 2012, Santander and Finpro sold their stake to a Chinese
25 http://www.keldagroup.com/about-us/investors.aspx
26 Annual Report 2013, p.22.
27 http://www.macquarie.com/mgl/com/profile
28 “Change in minority shareholders at Thames Water” Macquarie Group Announcement, 12
December 2011
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sovereign wealth fund, CIC,29 and a 13% stake was sold by Maquarie to the BT
Pension Scheme.30 In the case of each of these sales of ownership stakes, the
amount paid was undisclosed.
Southern Water was bought from the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2007 by a
consortium known as Greensands Holdings Ltd, registered in Jersey and owned by a
group of financial investors. The owners of Greensands include IIF International SW
UK Investments Limited (advised by JP Morgan Investments Inc.), the Northern Trust
Company (Australian asset management firm), Phildrew Nominees (a subsidiary of
UBS Global Asset Management), Sumaya Investments Ltd and various others
including a Superannuation Fund from Papua New Guinea.
These are the most complex and least transparent of ownership structures. The
regulated company sits in a chain of group companies, some of which are based in
tax havens, and funds are transferred up and down the ownership chain in a dense
sequence of dividends and interest payments on inter-group loans. Several holding
companies with similar names in the chain of ownership do nothing apart from
receive interest and/or dividends and then pay these out to other group companies.
These companies take advantage of exemptions on the disclosures required in
financial statements citing paragraph 3 (c) under FRS 8, Related Party Disclosures.
This means that the company is not required to disclose related party transactions
with other companies in the Group, making it difficult to trace transfers between
companies. Owners are investment and pension fund managers. These are referred
to in this paper as private equity-owned firms.
29 “Santander sells Thames Water stake to China” The Telegraph, 20 January 2012.
30 “BT Pension Scheme buys Thames Water stake” Financial Times, 30 May 2012.
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3.1.4 Not-for-profit – Welsh Water
In 2001, Welsh Water was taken over by Glas Cymru, a single purpose company,
limited by guarantee, formed specifically to own, finance and manage Welsh Water.
It has no shareholders. The company’s assets and capital investment are financed by
bonds and retained financial surpluses, which are reinvested in the company.
Following privatisation in 1989, Welsh Water took over the South Wales electricity
company, Swalec, in 1996 to form the company Hyder. In 2000 Hyder was taken over
by USA company, Western Power Distribution (WPD) which was only really
interested in the energy investment and sold off the water business to Glas Cymru in
2001 (De la Motte 2005).
3.2 New ownership structures
Ownership of water production has changed substantially since privatisation and
even more drastically in comparison with the model of local control which
dominated provision for most of the last century. The initial expansion of the
proportion of the population that owned shares, introduced at privatisation, was not
sustained. Ownership of water production has increasingly been concentrated, often
in the hands of global financial sector institutions. The sop approach considers that
these agents are not just neutral service providers but have particular features that
shape the way that water is perceived and provided.
Over the years since privatisation, the nature of private ownership has evolved. At
first, companies expanded their operations. Some established overseas subsidiaries
and diversified both into other sectors in the UK and in water services abroad. De la
Motte (2005) documents the expansionary activities of Welsh Water and Yorkshire
Water in the 1990s. In August 1991 the Chairman of Welsh Water (which had
expanded into electricity, luxury hotels and leisure facilities among other things),
John Elfed Jones, remarked that Welsh Water was a “mini Mitsubishi, capable of
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spawning many businesses.”31 The corporate focus has now shifted, with companies
stripping back to their core operations. For example, the former Chief Executive of
Anglian Water was reported to have secured substantial shareholder value by
transforming the company from an “ailing and overstretched would-be
multinational” by reverting the focus to “its core business as a regional water
company.”32
There has been a growing trend for companies to be taken off the LSE. Only three
companies remain listed and one of those was the subject of a takeover bid in 2013.33
Where companies are listed on the stock exchange, this allows for some degree of
external observation of corporate affairs. The process of de-listing reduces the
public scrutiny of the operations of the firms. For example, according to Ofwat
(2011e, p.14) regarding the delisting of Northumbrian Water Group (NWG): “As a
result of NWG’s acquisition, its shares were de-listed from the London Stock
Exchange and, therefore, we will no longer be able to rely on the listing of NWG to
make comparisons of how the market values it relative to other listed companies.
This type of analysis informs our judgments, for example, on the appropriate cost of
capital for water companies.”
Annexes 1 to 4 show that water providers are located within corporate groups of
varying complexity and there is a distinct pattern to these structures related to the
nature of ownership. Some companies are still active in other sectors outside the
core business of water and sewerage delivery. South West Water is part of the
Pennon Group which also owns waste management company, Viridor. The structures
of the groups that are listed and de-listed companies owned by infrastructure
companies are broadly similar. They have plc financing companies and holding
companies in their group structures. There are only one or two intermediary
31 “Wave of criticism for Welsh Water”, Tony Heath, The Guardian (London), 2 August 1991, Cited in De
la Motte (2005).
32 “Anglian Water chief ‘was worth’ reported £10m severance” Huntspost 24, 19 November 2010.
33 “Severn Trent rejects takeover approach” BBC News, 15 May 2013.
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companies between the licensed water provider and the ultimate UK owner. The
main difference is that, thereafter, the de-listed companies are then part of their
Asian parent companies groups.
In contrast, the de-listed firms owned by financial investors have a much longer
vertical structure. Yorkshire and Southern have ten companies between the licensed
provider and the UK owner. The ultimate owner for each of these corporate groups is
a special purpose vehicle (SPV), established in Jersey in three out of four cases.
Most of the companies in these structures do nothing apart from receive and pay out
funds (interest, dividends and/or loan repayments) to other companies in the group.
Each of these four corporate groups has a financing subsidiary in the Cayman
Islands (although with Anglian Water it is the immediate parent of the water provider
that is registered in the Cayman Islands). Welsh Water has a much simpler structure
but also has a subsidiary in the Cayman Islands. This would suggest that there is a
distinction to be made between types of private owner. The way in which the water
provider is incorporated in global financial capital is not uniform.
The review of corporate structure shows that national boundaries have little
significance in the ownership of water assets. This trend towards unlisted global
financial and infrastructure conglomerates as owners reflects trends in
infrastructure throughout the UK (OFT 2010). Water providers have become assets of
international private capital as infrastructure has become an asset class
(RiskMetrics 2008). Stakes in Thames Water have been bought and sold around the
world. In sharp contrast with the localised control of services which dominated most
of the last century, water companies are now part of global conglomerates linking
them to other infrastructure investments in the UK and elsewhere. The parent
company of the majority stakeholder in Thames, the Macquarie Group, operates in
28 countries. In the UK its infrastructure assets also include Bristol Airport and
National Car Parks. The owner of Northumbrian Water, CKI, has stakes in energy
companies. The owners of Wessex also own land and hotels in Asia. Whereas in the
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past a local authority would make decisions regarding water in relation to other local
services, now water is part of the international portfolio of investments of the
conglomerate. Governance that was once conceptualised on a local physical
geographical basis is now global with investments connected by finance (Torrance
2009).
With water production operating in the sphere of global finance, company managers
face the dual objectives of meeting the demands of shareholders as well as local
consumers. For the regulator the interests of private shareholders are compatible
with those of consumers. What is good for investors is deemed good for consumers:
“We expect companies to be efficient. A regulatory system that gives incentives to
companies to be efficient, and to make profits, is in the best long-term interests of
customers” (Ofwat 2008b, p.1). There are, however, clear reasons why these two
agents are likely to have conflicting objectives. Shareholders want a good return on
their investment. For listed companies, the share price and dividend yield are closely
monitored by the financial sector. Companies promise dividend growth. Pennon, for
example, in its 2013 Annual Report, says (p.12) that its group policy is to grow the
dividend by 4% above RPI up to the end of 2014/15. De-listed owners of water
companies have also benefitted from dividend payouts. One way to increase
shareholder earnings is to increase prices. Customers have seen bills increase by
considerably more than inflation since privatisation. There are clearly tensions
between the objectives of shareholders and consumers. To some degree these are
mediated through the state.
4 Regulation and the role of the state
There are several agencies involved in different aspects of regulation of the sector,
most of which come under the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA). Drinking water quality is monitored by the Drinking Water Inspectorate
(DWI) using standards derived from EU regulation. The Consumer Council for Water
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(CCW) represents water and sewerage consumers in England and Wales. The
Environment Agency (EA) protects the environment and promotes sustainable
development, playing a leading role in managing flood risk. Finally, the division of
DEFRA with responsibility for economic regulation is the Water Services Regulation
Authority (Ofwat). They state their responsibility as “making sure that the companies
we regulate provide consumers with a good quality and efficient service at a fair
price.” 34
There are agencies outside DEFRA that are involved in the delivery of water. If water
companies are unhappy with rulings by Ofwat they can appeal to the Competition
Commission which describes itself as “an independent public body which conducts
in-depth inquiries into mergers, markets and the regulation of the major regulated
industries.”35 The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) protects consumer interests in the UK
and is supposed to ensure that businesses are fair and competitive.
There are potential tensions between the objectives of the different regulatory
agencies, with for example environmental regulation requiring greater spending to
improve standards while economic regulation seeks to lower costs. Other countries
have different arrangements. For example in the USA it is common for a single body
to regulate across several network industries. The California Public Utilities
Commission, in particular, regulates investor-owned companies in water, energy,
transportation and communications (Consumer Focus 2010). Regulation is not just a
set of rules but is also evidence of a set of social relations that shape and control
economic activity. Furthermore, the regulatory framework goes beyond the
parameters set by government agencies and outcomes emerge from the practical
way in which the state engages with private enterprise. Regulation is social practice
as well as economic imperative (Bakker 2007).
34 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/the-water-services-regulation-authority
35 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/
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4.1 Economic regulation
The economic regulator, Ofwat, is required to operate within the strategic
framework and policy priorities set by the state via DEFRA. Most recently these are
written in their strategy document Water for Life (DEFRA 2011). The primary tasks of
Ofwat (according to the Water Industry Act (1991)) are:36
(a) to protect the interests of consumers, wherever appropriate by promoting
effective competition;
(b) to secure that the functions of a water and/or sewerage undertaker are
properly carried out in England and Wales;
(c) to secure that companies appointed to provide water and sewerage services
are able (in particular, by securing reasonable returns on their capital) to
finance the proper carrying out of those functions; and
(d) to secure that the activities authorised by the licence of a licensed water
supplier and any statutory functions imposed on it in consequence of the
licence are properly carried out.
In short, then, Ofwat is required to protect the interests of consumers by ensuring
that companies carry out their functions properly and to ensure that companies are
able to finance their operations (financeability). The main regulatory tool used by
Ofwat to achieve these aims is setting the upper price limit that each company can
charge for water.
36 Subject to these duties Ofwat has other responsibilities, listed in Ofwat (2010b, p.3):
 promote economy and efficiency by companies in their work;
 secure that no undue preference or discrimination is shown by companies in fixing charges;
 secure that consumers’ interests are protected where companies sell land;
 ensure that consumers’ interests are protected in relation to any unregulated activities of
companies;
 contribute to the achievement of sustainable development; and
 have regard to the principles of best regulatory practice.
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4.2 Price controls
The regulation structure applied is known as price cap or RPI-X also described as
‘incentive-based regulation’. In the UK water sector, instead of X, the term K is used.
Prices are set for five-year periods. Each company is allowed to increase their prices
by the RPI and an additional amount, K, (which could be negative) which is based on
the evolution of the company’s cost base, the cost of capital, financing requirements,
assumptions about efficiency and the size of the capital expenditure programme.
The value of K is also adjusted for previous performance against specified targets.
Determining the value of K is a lengthy, complex and contested area. Currently the
regulator is in negotiations with companies over price setting for the next Price
Review period which will determine prices from 2015 to 2020, a process known as
PR14.
A key element in the value of K is the estimated cost of capital. This is supposed to
be set at a level at which companies can finance their functions so that the price
limits set will allow an “efficiently financed company to deliver its services to
consumers and earn a return on capital, on average, at least equivalent to the cost of
capital” (Ofwat 2009a p.141). The cost of capital is applied to the Regulatory Capital
Value (RCV) which was initially calculated soon after privatization. New investment is
added to the RCV and depreciated over the course of its asset life (Ofwat 2011b).
Firms have had an incentive to have as high an RCV as possible leading to a bias
towards capital rather than operating expenditure (although the next price review is
set to change to a total expenditure approach with a view to preventing the capex
bias).
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4.2.1 The cost of capital
Ofwat works out a cost of debt and a cost of equity and then reaches what is termed
the “weighted average cost of capital” (WACC) which is weighted by the assumed
level of gearing (i.e. the ratio of debt to equity). The cost of capital is a central
component of the regulatory process and has a big impact on price. Ofwat estimates
that a 1% rise in the cost of capital results in approximately a 6 to 7% increase in
household bills (NAO 2013b).
To calculate the cost of debt, Ofwat makes assumptions about various factors
including the ratio of existing debt to new debt and the ratio of fixed to floating rate
of interest debt. This is a complicated process. Tools involved include observing
market data on bond yields, examining data on water company bonds, weighting
valuation towards current market data or forward projections of bond yields and
adjusting cost of debt estimates to take account of embedded debt which may be
positive or negative when compared with prevailing interest rates (Ofwat 2011a,
p.24).
The cost of equity is described as “the return required to induce the marginal
investor to purchase shares in the business” (Competition Commission 2010, p.7).
Ofwat uses the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to determine the cost of equity
and cites the Competition Commission (Ofwat 2011a, p.24): “we used the CAPM as
we considered it was the most robust way to measure the returns required by
shareholders.” According to CAPM, the required return on a financial asset is the
sum of the risk-free return (i.e. the return on an investment that has a risk level so
low that it is not considered to exist – such as government gilts) and a risk premium
that compensates the investor for exposure to the systematic risk of the financial
asset (beta).
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The systematic risk (beta) is the return that investors require to compensate them
for risks that cannot be eliminated by investors (for example through diversification).
Equity beta is used as a measure of the systematic risk of a particular sector or firm
which takes account of both the business systematic risk and the financial
systematic risk. If a firm or sector has a beta which is equal to 1, this suggests its
returns tend to move broadly in line with the capital market as a whole. If beta is
greater than 1, returns vary more than the market as a whole. If they are less than 1,
returns will vary less than the market as a whole. Systematic risk in the water sector
is relatively low. In the 2009 PR, the equity beta was set at 0.9 to reflect the market
uncertainty at the time and was lower than the beta of 1 that they used in the 2004
determinations (Ofwat 2009a, p. 128).
The WACC is a weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt. The
balance between the two is estimated for the calculation of the WACC in the price
setting process, although in practice it will vary from this considerably (see following
sections and Table 4). Table 1 shows the components of the WACC in the 2009 price
review.
Table 1: Component parts of the cost of capital at the 2009 price review
Gearing (debt: RCV) 57.5
Cost of equity
Risk-free rate 2.0%
Equity beta 0.9
Equity risk premium 5.4%
Cost of equity (post-tax) 7.1%
Cost of debt
Cost of debt (gross of tax shield) 3.6%
WACC-gross of tax shield 5.1%
WACC-post tax 4.5%
Source: Ofwat 2011a
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The level of gearing, at 57.5% was estimated to be a sustainable level to ensure the
companies remain comfortably “investment grade” 37 (discussed below). The
assumptions for the cost of debt drew on direct observations from the companies’
existing debt portfolios and forward projections weighted by an assessment of the
mix of existing debt that will remain in place over 2010-2015 with new financing and
refinancing requirement. The cost of equity was based on the view that the risk-free
rate of interest may increase in the medium term and the relatively high risk
premium reflected the economic backdrop at the time when emerging from the
financial crisis and facing the onset of economic recession (Ofwat 2010a, p.27). Note
that this is applied only to the regulated water utility and not to the rest of the
companies in the corporate group structure of Annexes 1 to 4.
4.2.2 Other adjustments
The price determination for water companies also includes an assessment of
company performance criteria which are evaluated over the preceding price review
period. Ofwat indicators are grouped into four themes. Company performance is
evaluated against targets for the following (Ofwat 2012b, p.3):
 Customer Experience (including service incentive mechanism (SIM) score and
number of internal sewer flooding incidents);
 Reliability and availability (serviceability and leakage);
 Environmental impact (greenhouse gas emissions and pollution incidents);
and
 Financial performance (including post-tax return on capital, credit rating –
required to be “investment grade,” and interest cover).
37 Two companies dominate the credit ratings agency industry: Moody’s Investors Service and
Standard and Poor’s. They provide a credit rating which is an indicator of the future relative
creditworthiness of securities. Grading is indicated by rating symbols with each representing a group
in which the credit characteristics are broadly similar. Ratings from Aaa to Baa are considered
“investment grade.” See Moody’s 2013b for more information.
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Other incentives include the Capital Expenditure Incentive Scheme (CIS) which
started in 2009 to provide an incentive for companies to outperform on their
business plans. Those that set ambitious plans that were “below the baseline”
receive higher rewards (Ofwat 2010c). The Asset Management Assessment (AMA)
provides an incentive for companies to lower their capital maintenance expenditure.
The Revenue Correction Mechanism (RCM) was derived to address variations in
revenue and to encourage companies to promote water efficiency.38 The RCM is used
to make an adjustment at the next price review to take account of each company’s
revenue outperformance or underperformance relative to the assumptions made in
the 2009 price review. If a company collects less revenue in the current price review
period due to demand reduction, this can be a factor taken into account in the next
period. Where revenues fall due to lower consumption, this is captured in higher
prices in the next price review period.
Firms see their K value (and hence customer bills) rise or fall in the subsequent
Price Review depending on their achievements with regard to performance targets
in the current review period. If customers are unhappy with their service provider,
this should be reflected in the company’s score for the “service incentive
mechanism” (SIM) indicator. The aim is that firms are financially penalised in the
next price review for poor customer service, meaning that this would put downward
pressure on the price the company can charge. The process is intended to mimic
competition.
4.2.3 The value of K
All of these extremely complex factors, as well as assumptions about efficiency
gains and future investment programmes, go into the calculation of K which
38 RD 14/07: Review of form of price control mechanism – letter from Ofwat to water companies
http://www.Ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/ltr_rd1407_revpricecontmech Accessed 31.5.2013.
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determines the amount by which firms are able to increase prices above the rate of
inflation. Table 2 shows the value of K for each year for the price review period 2010
to 2015. The average increase in price limits is 0.5% a year (above the RPI) but there
are variations from -4.3% for United Utilities in 2010/11 to +4.6% allowed for Thames
Water in 2012/13 (Ofwat 2009a).
Table 2: Values of K for water and sewerage companies, 2010 to 2015
Company Annual price limits (K factors)
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
Anglian -0.7 0.0 1.4 1.1 0.9
Dŵr Cymru -1.3 -1.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6
Northumbrian1 5.0 3.8 0.9 0.0 -1.0
Severn Trent -1.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.1
South West 1.1 3.4 2.5 1.3 1.1
Southern -0.7 0.0 3.6 3.3 -0.1
Thames 0.2 0.4 4.6 0.4 1.4
United Utilities -4.3 -0.2 0.6 1.0 1.2
Wessex 0.3 0.3 1.9 1.9 1.5
Yorkshire2 -1.2 -1.3 1.4 1.8 1.6
WaSC average (weighted) -0.8 0.2 1.7 0.7 0.5
http://www.Ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/reporting/rpt_tar_2010-11settingprices
These values are set in advance for the following five years. Companies can appeal
to the Competition Commission to challenge their K value. For example, Bristol
Water (a water-only company) made such an appeal when there was a disagreement
with Ofwat regarding the need for capital maintenance expenditure (Competition
Commission 2010). Furthermore, if firms’ costs increase over the course of the price
review period they can apply to the regulator for an “interim determination” to reset
their prices between five-yearly price reviews. In September 2013, Ofwat rejected a
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request from Thames Water to add a further 8% to the average household bill. The
grounds of the application by Thames included an increase in bad debts by more
than anticipated since the 2009 PR and the higher than expected cost of land for
development of a new sewerage plant.39
Within the specified prices which are linked to the value of K, firms are able to take
whatever measures they consider appropriate (within the parameters of regulation)
to increase their profits. There is no limit to the dividends which they can pay out or
regulatory constraints on the financial structure as these are considered to be
determined by the market.
5 Regulatory challenges
The economic regulator, Ofwat, sees its role as controlling the private sector in the
interests of consumers: “Our job is to make sure that your water company provides
you with a good quality service at a fair price.”40 However, the regulatory process is
not simple a binary relationship where the regulator sets the rules and the firms
follow. Rather, the sop approach understands the sector as a complex web of
relations between agents with conflicting interests and bargaining positions. It is
these that shape the settlements which lead to the outcomes for different parties.
The RPI-X price-cap structure was established in 1983 by Stephen Littlechild
originally for British Telecom and has since been used for elements of most
privatised utilities (gas, electricity, railways, airports as well as water). The idea is to
protect against abuses of monopoly in privatised industry. But its role was
considered to be temporary. Regulation was considered a means of “holding the
fort” (against monopolistic abuses) until the advent of competition (Stern 2003, p.8).
39 IB 20/13: ‘Ofwat confirms process for challenging Thames application for bill increases’
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/mediacentre/ibulletins/prs_ib2013tmsidok
40 http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aboutofwat/
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Water is never likely to be competitive but Ofwat is required to promote competition
wherever appropriate (see section 4.1).
Over the years, the wider business of regulation has evolved and has recently
attracted considerable attention in the wake of the financial crisis with proposals for
reforms to curtail the activities of banks. The UK’s Independent Commission on
Banking (ICB) chaired by Sir John Vickers has called for measures to protect
customers against high-risk investment banking activities to avoid a repeat of the
financial crisis. Proposed measures include the ring fencing of banks’ retail
activities and increasing levels of equity in financing structures. However, while
some contend that this will be damaging to the competitiveness of UK banks, others
believe that the reforms do not go far enough. In particular, they fail to address the
culture of risk-taking combined with high bonus payments for senior staff and the
moral hazards posed by being “too big to fail.”
There are parallels with the regulation of water and sewerage companies and many
of the private owners operate in the financial world of the Vickers Report. Some
owners are divisions of banks and most are financial institutions. The water business
has moved on substantially from the time when RPI-X was developed to protect
against monopolistic abuses. With companies in the hands of private equity
investors, water has become an appendage of the financial sector and is a tool for
revenue-raising. Owners are global consortia and conglomerates for which water is
a small money-making cog. The regulatory structure has mostly dealt with this
changing context by focusing the frame of reference on the practical performance of
the water provider alone, leaving the wider financialised aspects to take care of
themselves in the name of “market outcomes.”
This section reviews some of the major regulatory challenges in the water sector
grouped into three sections. First, as the sector has become more complicated, so
has the regulation, with questionable outcomes. Second, the state is caught in a bind
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when it comes to regulation because of the need to maintain attractiveness to
investors, not just in water but in all aspects of infrastructure. Finally, there has
been some regulatory innovation to strengthen the resilience of water providers
against the effects of financialisation but finance is notoriously difficult to regulate.
5.1 Practical challenges
The basic premise of the regulation of water (and other privatised monopolies) is
that the rules are set by the regulator to prevent monopolistic exploitation and to
ensure that the companies operate in the social interest. A key challenge, however,
is that the regulator has to rely on the companies to disclose important information
about their operations, while companies have an interest in restricting and distorting
the information that they provide. The traditional approach to regulation has been
found wanting, so recent reforms have attempted to broaden the framework for
monitoring water companies.
Ofwat has recently changed its approach to addressing information asymmetries.
Until 2012, companies were required to submit extensive reports every year with
data on numerous aspects of company performance, creating a growing regulatory
burden. Company business plans were checked by ‘reporters’ to provide assurances
about the quality of the data that companies submit. Engineering consultancies such
as Halcrow, Atkins, Black and Veatch were all involved in the 2009 Price Review
process.41 Over time the role of reporters expanded as the detail and complexity of
the reporting requirements increased. Reporting was costing each company the
equivalent of £1.5m a year and about £6m in a price review year (Ofwat 2010a p.19).
Companies complained about the high volume of information supplied, suggesting
that there was duplication and the information was not always used. A Report by
41 All reporters summaries are available here:
http://www.Ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase3/sub_fbp_pr09partasumm
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Consumer Focus (2010) raised concerns about the increased complexity (p.12):
“There is a genuine problem of accountability to customers when the process gives
rise to so much paperwork and consultations.” The Report highlighted a case where
a water company had submitted 1600 pages of documents, analysis and justification
to Ofwat’s PR09 process: “This level of overly detailed regulation of plans is not
conducive to innovation nor effective scrutiny by stakeholders.”
Ofwat was concerned that the level of detail for which they were looking, and that
companies provided, could mean that key risks become buried. The growth in
information does not necessarily improve outcomes and the level of detail made it
difficult to “see the wood from the trees” (Ofwat 2010a, p. 4). The same has been said
of the regulating of finance (Fine 2013, p.20) where the increasing weight and
complexity of regulation can make it less effective. More complex regulation to
combat more complex financialisation has not worked and can be counterproductive.
Increased complexity can lead people to manage the rules and act defensively while
the bigger picture is neglected (Haldane and Madouros 2012).
In the water sector, collecting and analysing large volumes of data were no
guarantee of compliance (Ofwat 2010a). The weaknesses of the regulatory
foundations were revealed when it came to light in the 2000s that a number of firms
had falsified information provided to Ofwat, and fines were imposed for deliberate
misreporting (on Severn Trent, Southern Water and Thames Water). The details of
the misreporting were not picked up through the regulatory process but originally
came to light through disclosures from the companies themselves.42
Ofwat has now changed tack and effectively places greater reliance on the
companies to regulate themselves. Firms now have to provide Ofwat with a “risk and
42 “Severn Trent: from expose to fraud charges” This is Money, 23 November 2007
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-1616348/Severn-Trent-from-exposeacute-to-
fraud-charges.html
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compliance statement” in which they set out how they have complied with their
relevant statutory licence and regulatory obligations. Directors are required to
confirm that the company has sufficient financial and management resources; that
there are sufficient rights and assets available to enable a special administrator to
run the business and to ensure that trade with associates is at arm’s length. They
have to publish a statement explaining any links between directors’ pay and
standards of performance, and they are required to maintain an investment grade
rating.43 The onus has shifted from the company ticking boxes to comply with the
rules of Ofwat to one where directors have to ensure that the firm is adhering to the
rules set by the regulator. Ofwat can still check up on enforcement of a specific
detail or with a specific company but the process of checking all indicators of all
companies has been set aside.44
This is described as light-touch regulation which is also potentially a reward for
good management (Ofwat 2010a). Whereas previously all firms faced the same level
of monitoring, in their 2011 paper, Ofwat set out the principle that, where a company
can demonstrate effective customer engagement and widespread support for a well-
evidenced business plan that delivers value to customer, the plan will be subjected
to a lower degree of scrutiny (DEFRA 2013, p.24). Ofwat is also proposing a “risk-
based” approach to regulation where activities will be directed according to an
assessment of risks to customers (Ofwat 2012a).
There have been additional measures to monitor activities of firms. Ofwat is
increasing the involvement of customers via the recently established Customer
Challenge Groups (CCGs): “We expect there to be a shift in emphasis from reporting
to the regulator to the companies giving their customers confidence that they are
fully meeting their obligations” (Ofwat 2010a, p.19). In broader terms the aim has
been to shift the focus of firms away from the regulator towards the needs of
43 http://ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/compliance/reportingperformance/riskcompliance
44 Interview, Southern Water, January 2014.
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consumers. This started with the introduction of the Service Incentive Mechanism
(SIM) mentioned above, where firms’ performance was assessed in part on the
experiences of consumers. The emphasis on consumers has grown and in PR 2014
firms have to show that their business plans reflect the needs of consumers. The
challenge, however, is that consumers are generally passive in the water sector in
England and Wales. Water companies are generally invisible. Most customers do not
know what they want from a water company beyond safe regular water at an
affordable price. The delivery of water is highly technical on many levels. There are
many ways in which companies can manipulate the presentation of information to
suit their interests. Consumers cannot know if they are being treated fairly. This is
discussed in more detail in section 8.3 on accountability.
In addition, retail competition is to be extended. The industry is being restructured,
with companies separating their wholesale from their retail activities so that all non-
household customers will be allowed to choose their water supplier from 2017.
Greater competition in the sector is intended to “harness market forces to allocate
and reveal the value of water and to support the development of effective and
efficient competition for wholesale services and retail services” (Ofwat 2012c, p.12).
This can, however, only have a limited impact on the sector as just around 10-13% of
the overall cost of water and sewerage is accounted for by the retail component with
most of the costs taken up with treatment and distribution. However, there are plans
for wholesale competition in the future (Ofwat 2008a).
These changes place more emphasis on firms to confirm that they are fulfilling the
terms of their licences and meeting the needs of consumers rather than supplying
reams of reports to Ofwat. There are, however, some signals from other regulatory
agencies that there are gaps in regulation. A study by the National Audit Office (NAO)
raised concerns after their review of Ofwat. As part of this they checked a large
infrastructure project and found that it was not clear that there was a reliable
business case to justify the infrastructure when Ofwat decided to approve the
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company’s business plan. The NAO was also concerned that Ofwat does not review
the extent of contingency costs in the companies’ business plans with Ofwat
considering this to be a matter for companies. Furthermore, Ofwat also does not
have independent assurances that the infrastructure is provided to the agreed
specification so companies can increase their profits by providing new infrastructure
more cheaply than specified with a possible adverse impact of quality (NAO 2013b).
While the previous method of data intensive regulation had limitations, in light of the
NAO findings, there remains considerable scope for firms to manipulate operations
to their advantage.
The final point to make on the practical challenges of regulation is that it is costly.
Ofwat makes considerable use of consultants, and the latest price review and
changes to legislation have led to overspending. Even with a light touch approach,
regulation is not cheap. In January 2014, Ofwat spent £324,000 on consultancy fees.
A total of £212,278.10 was spent on three separate pieces of work with
PriceWaterhouse Coopers on technical consultancy for work on the recent Thames
Water Interim Determination request to increase customer prices in 2014-15. 45 In
February 2013, the Board of Ofwat approved a £21.5m budget for 2013-14 which
included £5.6m for external consultancy and legal support. This, however, fell short
of costs and a further £5m needed to be raised from licence fees and reserves
(Ofwat 2014a).
5.2 Need to maintain investment
Ofwat has an obligation to ensure that firms maintain financeability which is defined
as “how we make sure that the price limits we set are sufficient for efficient
companies to raise the finance they need so that they can invest to deliver the
service that customers expect” (Ofwat 2011b, p.4). A company is considered to be
45 “Ofwat spends £324,000 on consultancy fees in January 2014” waterbriefing.org 13 February 2014.
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financeable if its revenues, profits and cash flows allow it to raise finance on
“reasonable terms” in capital markets (Ofwat 2009a, p.135). There are a number of
financial ratios and indicators that are monitored by Ofwat to ensure that
financeablity is maintained including cash interest cover (i.e. funds from operations:
gross interest), adjusted cash interest cover (i.e. funds from operations less capital
charges: net interest), funds from operations: debt; retained cash flow: debt and
gearing (i.e. net debt: regulatory capital value). There are various thresholds for
each of these (Ofwat 2009a, p. 136; 2011b, p.22).
However, the main test for financeability is the credit rating provided by the three
main credit ratings agencies: Moody’s, Standard & Poors and Fitch. Firms need to
maintain a credit rating well within “investment grade range” (Ofwat 2011b, p.22).
The higher the credit rating, the lower the borrowing costs. Ofwat lists the important
factors that shape credit ratings (Ofwat 2011b, p.19):
 the regulatory environment;
 the asset ownership model;
 operational characteristics of the company in question;
 asset risk;
 stability of the business model;
 the quality of management; and
 financial structure.
According to Moody’s, credit ratings for water companies are weighted so that 40%
of the rating value is based on the regulatory environment and asset ownership
model (Moody’s 2009). The regulatory structure itself, then, is a determinant of the
financeability of firms, directly affecting the credit ratings of water companies which
in turn has an impact on their ability to raise funds on the capital markets. This is a
potential constraint on the regulator as stricter regulation, which reduces profits,
runs the risk of reducing a company’s credit rating and increasing their financing
costs. According to Moody’s (2012, p.5): “A less favourable [regulatory] regime could
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result in downward ratings pressure.” Furthermore, stricter regulation runs the risk
of destabilising the whole industry: “For more leveraged and therefore lower-rated
funding structures, the stability of the ratings is not only in the interest of bond
holders but also an important factor for the long-term sustainability of the financing
structure itself” (Moody’s 2010, p. 13).
This shows that regulation does not amount to a set of exogenous rules that are
observed by water companies. Rather, the regulatory process itself is intrinsic to the
operation of the sector. Regulatory stability is clearly important to investors but also
changes that reduce the returns are unpopular and threaten to lower the
attractiveness of the sector. For example, in evidence presented to the UK
Government in February 2013 on the Draft Water Bill it was suggested that
“Uncertainty in the proposed legislation may have an impact on the way investors
view the water industry, leading to increased financing costs … Where we have
recommended amendments to the legislation we have been conscious of the impact
on investor confidence and any potential impact on the costs paid by household and
business customers” (House of Commons 2013, p.3).
The majority of infrastructure investment in the UK is financed by the private sector
(National Infrastructure Plan 2011). International investors have portfolios across
sectors. For example, the owner of Northumbrian Water, Cheung Kong Industries
(CKI) also has stakes in gas and electricity companies in the UK. The UK
infrastructure portfolio of Macquarie was mentioned above. The UK’s national
infrastructure plan intends to raise almost two-thirds of investment in the current
pipeline from private sources (UK National Infrastructure Plan 2011, p.101). This
means that the water regulator needs to avoid upsetting investors. In February 2012,
a representative of the Singapore Sovereign Wealth Fund, GIC, which has stakes in
Yorkshire Water as well as British Airports Authority, Associated British Ports and
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the second largest holding of Royal Mail shares 46 wrote to Ofwat expressing
concerns about proposed modifications to the pricing methodology, which “risk
undermining the current stability of and confidence in the current regulatory
framework” adding that “Such changes materially increase the perceived risk for
investors in the UK water sector, potentially pushing up both the cost of equity and
debt financing and ultimately the cost to consumers.” As before, there is an attempt
to present the interests of private financial capital as aligned with those of water
consumers.
Regarding the UK infrastructure plan, they say in their letter “the proposed licence
modifications would undermine the stable and transparent regulatory regime” and
would therefore “reduce the attractiveness of investment in UK infrastructure, and
not just the water sector, at the time when the UK Government is actively trying to
raise new sources of capital to fund large infrastructure projects.” GIC are
suggesting that changes to regulation may be a deterrent to investors. This can also
apply to listed companies. In 2010, Invesco Perpetual, the biggest shareholder in
United Utilities disposed of almost all of its stake in the company, having already
significantly reduced its stake in Severn Trent earlier in the year. The head of
investment at Invesco had warned that equity investors might “exit the ship” if the
regulator continued to behave like “Robin Hood.”47
The regulator has to achieve a balance between the needs of investors and those of
consumers but there is little that consumers can do if they are unhappy with the
price they have to pay for their water, and most can afford a small price increase. If
investors are unhappy with their returns, however, this risks jeopardising the
country’s whole programme of infrastructure investment. Tighter regulation runs
the risk of, firstly, raising the cost of capital and, secondly, scaring firms away
46 “Singapore buys 4pc of Royal Mail” The Telegraph 25 October 2013.
47 “United Utilities investor pulls plug” Financial Times, 3 December 2010.
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altogether. The regulator and the government have a strong incentive to skew prices
to suit investors rather than customers.
Water pricing is inevitably a political issue. The settlement between firms and
consumers involves political judgement, despite efforts to depoliticise the structure
and create a strictly technical allocation. The political nature of the water pricing
attracted greater attention towards the end of 2013. Under the terms of the 2009
price review, firms were entitled to increase prices but this was highly contentious in
the context of declining real wages. The Environment Secretary, Owen Patterson,
wrote to water firms asking them not to increase prices by the full amount allowed
in the terms of PR09. The letter called on water companies to ensure customers got
a fair deal stressing the tough times facing “hard working people.”48 According to
Moody’s (2013a), the letter is further evidence of the politically-charged environment
in which the water sector operates. Their position is that the letter to the companies’
CEOs does not amount to interference with the independent economic regulation of
the sector by Ofwat. But they caution: “However, if political pressure were to result
in Ofwat departing from its established price setting methodologies and the outcome
of the 2014 price review were politically driven, we would view this as a clear credit
negative for the sector.”
5.3 Uncertainty and headroom
The regulatory process sets prices in advance for a five-year period based on
assumptions about costs. These cannot be known with certainty and the process
requires judgements and assumptions regarding future costs. Past price
determinations have provided what is termed “headroom” which allows for “any
possible increase in the cost of capital that, as a result, might jeopardise a
company’s ability to finance its required capital programme” (Ofwat 2011a p.28). The
48 “U.K. Urges Water Companies to Curb Increases That Top Inflation” Bloomberg News, 5 November
2013
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cost of debt has consistently been below that assumed in the price reviews by Ofwat
(Ofwat 2013) (Fig 4).
Figure 4: Assumed and actual costs of debt for Ofwat Price Reviews 1994 to 2009
Source: Ofwat 2013
Past price determinations have allowed some extra room for companies so that they
can withstand unforeseen price shocks. In the 1999 and 2004 price determinations,
companies were allowed additional revenue to ensure that price limits left them with
sufficient financial flexibility to sustain operations and investment programmes in
the face of possible cost shocks. This “revenue uplift” amounted (in 2009-10 prices)
to £188m in 1999 and £508m in 2005. This boost to company finances is justified by
Ofwat as follows: “We considered these uplifts were necessary for us to fulfil our
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primary duty to secure that efficient companies were able to finance their functions”
(Ofwat 2011b, p.24). Ofwat provides some leeway for firms in part in order to
replicate a “normal company” for which an appropriate response to cost shocks
might be to raise the price at which it sells goods, restricting or delaying investment,
delaying dividend payments, considering alternative debt financing approaches or
raising new equity. These options are more limited for a regulated company as they
cannot raise prices so Ofwat allows some room for this in the price structure (which
increases the price paid by customers).
At the time of the last price review in 2009, the economy was feeling the effects of
the global financial crisis, and there was concern that financing costs might rise. In
practice, however, interest rates remained low and the UK water sector has been
attractive to investors, providing predictable returns with a perceived ‘safe haven’
status in the context of concerns in the euro area (Moody’s 2012b). The cost of debt
has again been below the level assumed in the price review. Since then, Ofwat
recognizes that “there has been a sustained decline in the market cost of debt with
the result that consumers have borne the brunt of a cost of debt allowance that was
higher than the market rates in previous price determinations” (Ofwat 2011a, p.29).
Companies have gained considerably since the last review by accessing debt at far
lower interest rates than Ofwat assumed. Firms have also gained by restructuring
their finances to increase the proportion of debt- rather than equity-based financing
so that financial costs are lower than assumed in the 2009 Price Review. The
regulatory process appears to be structured so that the earnings of firms are
sustained – and even enhanced – while consumers pay more in the case of an
increase in perceived risk. This is a key challenge of the RPI-X process. The gains
from lower cost of capital should in theory be clawed back in the next price review
period but this will also be affected by changes in expectations about the future cost
of capital. While most households may be able to pay a bit more for water, the
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regulator cannot risk firms not being able to finance themselves which tips the
balance in favour of the water and sewerage provider.
5.4 Governing financialisation
As the water sector has become increasingly financialised and water is an asset of
private equity firms, financial innovation has changed the financing structures of
water companies and the nature of the corporate groups within which they are
situated. In response, the regulator has introduced a requirement for firms to
ensure that the licensed water company is protected. Most companies are required
by Condition P of their licence to obtain legally enforceable undertakings from their
ultimate controller(s)49 that they will: provide the regulated company with all the
information it needs to comply with its obligations under the Water Industry Act
(1991); refrain from any action which would or may cause the regulated company to
breach any obligations under the WIA (1991) and ensure that there are no less than
three independent non-executive directors on the regulated company’s Board (Ofwat
2014c).
In January 2014, Ofwat brought out a consultation paper setting out principles for the
management of group companies, recognising that the existing regulations were
established when most companies were listed on the stock exchange (Ofwat 2014b).
In common with the shift to light-touch regulation above, these principles are
intended to allow companies to take greater ownership of, and accountability for,
delivery to customers and place less emphasis on meeting regulatory requirements.
Part of the reason for this is the need to maintain legitimacy with customers as the
system will collapse without payments from customers.
49 The ultimate controller is defined in the licence as “any person who or which (alone or jointly with
others and whether directly or indirectly) is (in the reasonable opinion of the Water Services
Regulation Authority) in a position to control or to exercise material influence over the policy or
affairs of the Appointee or of any holding company of the Appointee” (Ofwat 2014c, p.6).
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Ofwat (2014c) sets out three principles that should apply as a minimum to any
company operating in the sector in the context of delisting from the stock exchange:
 Transparency – the details of the group structure should be clearly set out with
information on debt and equity structures and directors’ interests;
 Risk – the company will not put the regulated company at risk and the Board of
the regulated company should be allowed to “run the business as if it is a
separate public limited company” (i.e. with sufficient resources and expertise)
(Ofwat 2014c, p.12); and
 Long-term decision-making – the regulated company should be supported to
address the long-term challenges of the business (population growth and climate
change).
These principles and recommendations from the regulator seem to be pushing for
some degree of separation between the regulated company and its corporate group
although these are broad principles and the company itself is responsible for
meeting standards. However, the regulator does not get involved in matters related
to deeper financialisation such as group financial activity, borrowing or dividends.
When firms are taken over, Ofwat has a consultation process, and this raised some
concerns from observers related to financialisation but Ofwat did not see any reason
to modify the licenses and was satisfied with assurances from the investors. For
example, when Yorkshire Water was taken over, the Consumer Council for Water
(CCW) sought assurances about the ability to identify successfully the entities that
were to provide the undertakings under licence Condition P (Ofwat 2009b). When
Thames was taken over, both CCW and infrastructure consultant, Martin Blaiklock,
considered the ownership structure to be unnecessarily complex. Blaiklock raised
concerns about the lack of information available regarding the new owners (Ofwat
2007a). Ofwat in the consultation took the view that it was up to Yorkshire Water to
demonstrate compliance with the licence requirements (Ofwat 2009b). Similarly with
the takeover of Thames Water, Ofwat’s position was that consumers should be able
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
to assume that a change of ownership will have no adverse impact on the price or
quality of service (Ofwat 2007a).
With regard to gearing, Ofwat have said time and again that the capital structures
adopted are a matter for companies and the markets (e.g. Ofwat 2009b; Ofwat 2007a,
Ofwat 2011b). However, where capital restructuring brings about “tax efficiencies”
these should be passed to customers at the next price review (e.g. Ofwat 2009b;
Ofwat 2007a, Ofwat 2011b). If firms can access capital more cheaply by using more
debt finance rather than equity, Ofwat considers that companies can benefit in the
short term by “outperforming” on Ofwat’s assumptions (which means raising capital
more cheaply than estimated in the price review process) but customers benefit
from this cheaper financing over time through the price setting process (Ofwat
2011b, p.36).
In response to suggestions that Ofwat should specify a cap on gearing levels or set
specific liquidity ratios, the regulator sees disadvantages to bringing such measures
into the companies’ licences. Such ratios are considered to be contrary to the
incentive-based regulatory framework and to reduce flexibility to change financing
arrangements in the future. In addition, credit ratings provide an opinion on the
future ability of a firm to meet its commitments while the regulator could only obtain
historic financial ratios which would be less useful. Furthermore, there are practical
difficulties with determining the most appropriate financial ratios and threshold
levels: “we are unlikely to be in a better position than the credit rating agencies or
the markets themselves to determine appropriate constraints on financial ratios and
capital structure” (Ofwat 2011b, p. 41).
This suggests that the regulator has limited capacity with which to guard against
predatory financial practices. Ofwat cannot control what firms do with regard to
financial engineering without more invasive and intrusive regulation, and experience
suggests that more regulatory complexity does not improve outcomes. The fallback
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position is to increase reliance on credit ratings agencies, the markets and the
companies themselves. Financial companies (which now own some of the WaSCs)
have proved extremely difficult to control. The financial crisis showed the
unpredictability of finance. Fine (2013, p.18) cites Engelen to say that “finance is now
technically ungovernable so that any attempt to restore finance to some kind of
equilibrium or balance is futile because instability is written into its DNA.” With
regard to regulation, the quote continues, “with bricolage, restorative regulation
ceases to be an external constraint and becomes an input for future financial
improvisation by creative bricoleurs.” This could apply equally to the water sector.
Regulatory constraints have led to financial innovation, particularly in relation to
gearing and debt.
6 Finance and financialisation
When water was privatized, private finance was perceived as a substitute for public
funding in order to reduce the burden on the public purse. Twenty-four years later,
water companies are used to raise revenue for international financial corporations in
ways that were unimaginable in 1989. Where water was once a dull predictable
utility investment, it has now become a speculative asset.
While the regulator, Ofwat, controls the price that the regulated company can
charge. However, a whole world of financial innovation has evolved around this
regulated component. Water firms are part of global companies, many with offshore
ownership and complex transactions within a corporate group. Group companies,
particularly those owned by private-equity firms, transfer revenue, debts, dividends
and interest up and down companies within group structures to maximize
shareholder returns.50 Mostly this activity is outside the scope of Ofwat.51
50 Just a brief look at the accounts of the Thames Water group gives a hint of the complexities of the
inter-company financial flows. The ultimate (UK) parent is Kemble Water Holdings, and 97% of the
group income comes from the regulated business (TWUL). Yet within this, funds move around
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Supporters of privatization argue that the structure that has evolved has benefitted
customers, making firms more efficient and enabling capital investment. Certainly
the period since privatization has provided a consistent and stable supply of good
quality water throughout the country. However, this does not preclude financial
restructuring in the interests of shareholders. Levels of debt have escalated to pre-
privatisation levels and beyond, and interest payments have increased hugely. High
gearing levels have reduced the creditworthiness of some firms and increased
vulnerability to price shocks. This section looks at some of the financial innovation
taking place in the sector and considers the effects this may have.
6.1 Spending on investment?
There is no question that there has been substantial infrastructure investment on
the part of water companies. Frontier Economics shows that the industry has
invested around £100bn since privatisation, which is equivalent to £5,000 for every
household in England and Wales (Frontier Economics 2013). Investment is now
reportedly running at some £80 million per week.52
Most of the companies regulated by Ofwat are ‘cash negative’ (e.g. Ofwat 2010b,
p.29, Ofwat 2011b) which means that they spend more each year than they collect
from customers’ bills. According to Ofwat, this is to finance capital investment with
borrowings that are repaid from customers’ bills over the medium to long term (say,
ten to forty years) (Ofwat 2010b). At privatisation, the need to raise finance for
between companies. For example, Kemble Water Liberty Ltd has a loan to its subsidiary, Kemble
Water Structure Ltd of £2.4bn which incurs interest at 18% and a loan to its parent – Kemble Water
Eurobond Plc - of £2.3bn which incurs interest at 18% (Kemble Water Liberty Ltd Accounts, 2013,
p.13). Kemble Water Finance Ltd owes its parent, Kemble Water Structure Ltd, £3.1bn at interest of
18% (Kemble Water Finance Ltd accounts 2013).
51 Except for the proviso of Condition P in the licences of water companies that requires that, where it
is part of a large group, the regulated company has to avoid any actions that would place the
regulated company in breach of the conditions of its appointment (Ofwat Glossary of Terms).
52 www.water.org.uk
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investment was considered to be temporary to address a backlog (Helm 2005). In the
years following privatization, it was assumed that capital investment would tail off
over time and the companies would become cash positive. But investment has
continued to remain high despite the generally negative cash flow (Ofwat 2011b,
p.37). Investment finance is raised on capital markets. In many respects, it seems
that finance is simply regarded as a tool for capital investment which generates an
appropriate return for investors.
However, there is clearly a disconnect between the raising of finance to pay for
infrastructure investment and the increasingly intricate financial operations within
complex group structures which seem to be aimed at maximising shareholder
returns. In 2013, Sonia Brown, the Chief Regulation Officer of Ofwat, referred to
companies making a 28% return on investment (Ofwat 2013). Turner (2013) shows
how companies have made high returns with dividend payments and gains in share
prices as well as tax avoidance strategies. Investors have shown strong interest in
the English water sector. The high premiums offered in takeover bids indicate that
water companies are attractive investments. In 2011, Northumbrian Water was
bought for £2.4bn which was about 30% more than the regulatory capital value (RCV
- a rough proxy for enterprise value). In June 2013, a £5.3bn bid for Severn Trent was
rejected, even though the final bid represented a premium of 36% on the company’s
RCV.53 Companies would appear to be making considerably more profit than the
5.1% cost of capital on which their prices were set in the last review (Table 1). The
rest of this section considers recent trends in the financing activities of companies
and explores ways in which shareholder value may be increased.
6.2 Financial complexity and increasing debt
53 “Water companies’ M&A pipeline blocked” Financial Times 13 June 2013.
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The level of gearing in the sector has increased dramatically over the past decade
(Figure 5) as firms have moved to replace equity with debt. As recently as the last
price review process in 2009, Ofwat assumed a gearing level for the sector of 57.5%
(Table 1). However, by 2013 some companies had gearing levels that were much
higher, reaching more than 80% in some cases. These firms obtain only a fifth of
their financing from equity.
Figure 5: UK ten privatised water and sanitation companies: gearing (%)
Source: Armitage 2012
Some firms have much higher levels of gearing than others. Table 3 shows the credit
rating and the gearing level of nine of the ten water and sewerage companies in
England and Wales. The table shows that private-equity owned water companies
have the highest levels of gearing (Yorkshire (82.6%); Southern (81.3%); Anglian
(80.4%); and Thames (79%)).54
Table 3: Credit ratings and gearing levels for WaSCs
54 South East Water Ltd, a water-only company, had the highest gearing level at 83.6%.
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Credit rating55 Outlook Company GEARING -Net
debt/RAV
A3 Stable Dwr Cymru (Welsh Water) 61.7
A3 Stable United Utilities Water Plc 62.7
A3 Stable Severn Trent Water Ltd 66.7
A3 Stable Wessex Water 68.1
Baa1 Stable Northumbrian Water Ltd 70.4
Baa1 Stable Thames Water Utilities Ltd 79.0
Baa1 Stable Anglian Water Services 80.4
Baa1 Stable Yorkshire Water Services Ltd 82.6
Baa2 Negative Southern Water Services Ltd 81.3
Source: Moody’s 2013c
The increase in gearing has been achieved by a combination of increasing debt and
reducing (or at least not increasing) equity. For the nine for-profit companies studied
in depth in this research, some have seen huge increases in net debt over the past
ten years (Table 4). The biggest rise is with Thames Water where net debt has
increased by 183%. Yorkshire and Southern have also seen debts increase by over
100%. The total value of net debt has increased by 63% in the past ten years.
Meanwhile, equity has fallen by 37% over the same period.
55 Based on corporate family and not class of debt.
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Table 4: Change in net debt, equity and fixed assets, 2003-2013 (£m, 2013 prices)56
Net Debt Equity Fixed Assets
2013 2003 % 2013 2003 % 2013 2003 %
Yorkshire 3,424 1,587 116 2,507 2,122 18 6,280 4,358 44
Anglian 5,262 4,451 18 946 2,144 -56 5,034 5,002 1
Southern 3,548 1,701 109 914 1,085 -16 4,264 3,561 20
Northumbrian 2,323 1,658 40 886 1,158 -23 3,471 3,361 3
South West 1,600 1,176 36 480 1,248 -62 2,555 2,587 -1
Wessex 1,682 1,340 26 202 515 -61 2,167 2,064 5
Severn Trent 4,623 2,943 57 868 2,855 -70 6,738 6,360 6
United Utilities 6,030 3,366 79 2,054 2,880 -29 8,651 7,109 22
Thames 8,373 2,962 183 1,234 2,061 -40 9,298 6,663 40
Total 36,865 21,184 74 10,090 16,068 -37 48,458 41,065 18
Source: Author’s calculations using company reports
To determine whether the increase in borrowing was accompanied by a parallel
expansion in capital expenditure, the table shows the change in the value of tangible
fixed assets as stated in the company accounts over the same period. Total fixed
assets have increased by just 18%. Borrowing may not match size of the change in
the asset base exactly but the scale of the discrepancy suggests that borrowing is for
reasons other than to invest in capital assets. On average, net debt has increased by
over four times the increase in value of tangible fixed assets. Possible reasons why
firms may have increased debt are explored below but first I consider how gearing
can be raised to such high levels.
56 Data was converted to 2013 prices using the Office of National Statistics Retail Price Index data,
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/data-
selector.html?cdid=CZBH&dataset=mm23&table-id=2.2
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6.3 Financialisation and securitisation
The use of complex financial tools has been increasingly commonplace in water
companies. These have been used to combat risk, for example, hedging against
changes in exchange rates and interest rates. In some cases, some more complex
derivatives are considered to have increased vulnerability. Southern Water has a
lower credit rating than the other companies at Baa2 with a negative outlook (Table
3). According to Moody’s,57 this “reflects additional risks embedded in the company’s
derivative portfolio.” The company has established £1.3bn of swap arrangements, in
part to compensate for lower-than-forecast revenue over the current price review
period.58 The company has devised what Moody’s calls a “synthetic index-linked
debt” which is a conventional fixed rate bond with index-linked swaps. Moody’s sees
the benefit from the swaps as short-lived and believes they will limit future financial
flexibility. They also point out that the credit rating is in part due to the high level of
debt: “the negative outlook reflects the company’s comparatively highly leveraged
capital structure and embedded cost of debt which leaves the company more
exposed to the risk of a challenging regulatory price determination than many of its
peers.”
Firms are constrained because raising their gearing levels can affect their credit
worthiness, and hence their credit rating, which needs to be maintained according to
the terms of their licences. However, a method of financial restructuring has been
devised which reduces the ratings impact of gearing increases. Five water
companies have carried out this process, known as Whole Business Securitisation
(WBS). The first WBS in the water sector was carried out by Welsh Water when it was
taken over by the not-for-profit Glas Cymru in 2001, a company limited by guarantee.
With little finance with which to buy the company, a new financing arrangement was
57 “Moody’s affirms Southern Water’s ratings, maintains negative outlook” Global Credit Research,
Moody’s 12 August 2013, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-affirms-Southern-Waters-
ratings-maintains-negative-outlook--PR_279757
58 Interview, Southern Water, January 2014.
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devised by the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), to enable the company to be bought
with very high levels of debt. This has been described as a “debt-only model” (Helm
2005, p.14). The model has since been adopted by the four private-equity owned
firms, Anglian, Thames, Southern and Yorkshire.
The process of WBS allows the securitisation of the company’s future revenue
streams. A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV – a company created specifically for this
purpose) is created which acts as an intermediary between the financiers and the
water company. The SPV raises funds by issuing bonds and makes a loan to the
borrowing company (the water provider). Finance is raised on the basis of the
identifiable cash flows from the operating revenues of a segment of a business,
which with water companies is the revenue stream from future bill payments. The
SPV has no physical assets as security for the raising of finance. With the WBS
structure, the only material asset of the SPV is the right to be paid principal and
interest under its loan to the borrowing company, and it is this which is securitised.
So future revenue streams, which are derived from customers paying their water
bills, are packaged into a tradable financial product and sold to investors. This type
of financing arrangement is best suited to firms with stable and predictable cash
flows from the operating revenues of a segment of a business. So a regulated water
utility is ideal. Regulatory stability is required to ensure the predictability of future
revenues.
The securitisation process requires that the water/wastewater business is typically
separated from other activities and ring-fenced. In order to protect the quality of the
assets, covenants are set that provide protection for lenders. A securitised company
agrees or “covenants” to maintain the assets to a certain standard. These are
usually categorised as lock up, trigger events and events of default. The combination
of factors such as the ring-fenced nature of the business and the restrictions in
covenant package provide what is known as a “rating uplift” which means that that
high levels of gearing are associated with a higher credit rating than previously. This
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can reduce a firm’s cost of borrowing or means that firms can maintain a lower
credit rating with a higher level of debt.
This kind of financial restructuring has enabled companies to consolidate at least
some of the debt that they raise to buy the water provider (acquisition debt) into the
debts of the company itself via the securitisation structure. All five of the companies
that have established WBS have at least one subsidiary in their ring-fenced group
located in the Cayman Islands. One of the reasons for this is to overcome
restrictions in UK corporate law regarding the raising of debt to facilitate an
acquisition. The 2013 accounts of Yorkshire Water state (p.14) that “the raising of
debt under a WBS by a UK company in respect of debt used to facilitate an
acquisition (e.g. Kelda Group Plc’s acquisition in February 2008) is not possible for
those UK companies allowed to issue listed corporate debt. This is not the case for
companies incorporated in the Cayman Islands and is the reason why the Cayman
Islands is now a commonly used jurisdiction for establishing WBSs.” According to
Stuart Siddal, the Finance Director of Thames Water, there were no tax advantages
to the company having a subsidiary in the Cayman Islands as the funding vehicle was
registered in the UK for tax: “the Cayman Island companies are there purely to
comply with UK company law requirements for the acquisition financing structure.”59
As a result of this structure, investors have been able to buy water companies in part
using debt that they then add to the debts of the company which contributes to the
increase in gearing. When Welsh Water was taken over by Glas Cymru, the
acquisition was financed at first using a bridging loan from Citigroup and RBS and
this then was refinanced by the WBS which was secured by the company’s assets
based on the future revenue which itself relies on regulatory stability. This was
described as “the first large transaction which relied on an analysis of a regulatory
59“Our conscience is clear over tax and profits, says Thames Water”, Daily Telegraph, 10 June 2013.
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framework to support the credit.”60 This approach was followed by the takeover of
Anglian Water in 2002 leaving the water part of the business “financed almost
entirely by debt.”61
The financial complexity of corporate group structures makes the impact of
increased leverage more difficult to identify. Intercompany loans have increased
substantially and firms transfer revenue to and from holding companies in the
group. A paper from Moody’s suggests that one of the reasons for creating a loan to
a holding company in the wider group is to “upstream the proceeds from the
introduction of the highly leveraged structure” (Moody’s 2010 p.10). A combined
study of the electricity and water sectors by Ofwat and Ofgem (2006) suggests (p.30)
that transfers across group companies can obscure the underlying finances of the
group: “equity finance in the regulated business can be manufactured by the group
issuing debt from a holding company.” The regulatory boundaries only apply to the
licensed water provider but this may be owned by a holding company that carries
additional debt. There are no regulations on the holding company to maintain
investment-grade status although the report suggests that the credit ratings
agencies would take the financial health of the holding companies into account in
their assessment of credit worthiness.
Table 3 shows the different outcomes from the securitisation process. Welsh Water
now has one of the highest credit ratings and lowest gearing levels while the four
private-equity owned firms have the highest gearing and lowest ratings. This
suggests that the outcome is not derived from the securitisation process itself but
from the way in which it is used and the motives of the company owners. The
reasons for, and impact of, high gearing are considered below.
60 “2001: Glas Cymru’s £1.92bn bond: foundation of secured bonds/WBS International Financing
Review, IFR 2000 Issue Supplement.
61 “Securitisation deals of the year” IFLR 9 April 2003.
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6.4 Why increase gearing?
Why should firms increase borrowing to such high levels? There has been some
increase in capital investment but this is only part of the reason for the increase. One
factor is that debt is cheaper than equity. As table 1 shows, debt is lower risk and so
attracts a lower rate of return than equity. Shifting the financing structure to higher
levels of debt, rather than equity, will lower financing costs below those assumed in
the price review. This alone will ensure that companies ‘outperform’ on the cost of
capital assumed in the price review. However, there are also other possible reasons
for the rise in gearing. Ofwat (2011b) attributes a growing proportion of the increase
to financial restructuring and “past dividend policies” (p. 36).
Most water companies pay little or no tax. This has been the subject of growing
media interest62 and has been covered extensively, for example, by Turner (2013) and
has been taken up by Liberal Democrat MP, Simon Hughes.63 The low tax payments
are largely the result of deferred tax arrangements which stem from measures to
encourage investment. However, interest payments are tax deductible and so high
interest payments will reduce tax liabilities. Interest payments by water companies
have soared in the past two decades. The yearly charge for net interest payable for
the nine England WaSCs increased from £288m to over £2,000m in the twenty years
from 1993 to 2012 (in 2012 prices).64
A report commissioned by Severn Trent and National Grid (2012) suggested that high
gearing was initially driven at least in part by the tax advantages to be gained by
increasing debts. This is spelled out in the 2013 accounts of Yorkshire Water which
state (p.14) that the securitised model provides protections which means
“companies can finance themselves with increasing amounts of debt. This means
they pay less corporation tax.”
62 EG: “Water companies pay little or no tax on huge profits” The Guardian, 10 November 2012;
“Thames Water paid no corporation tax for the year” BBC News, 10 June 2013.
63 http://simonhughes.org.uk
64 Author’s calculation based on data from company reports.
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Where the interest paid is to shareholders on loans to the company, there are even
greater benefits for the owners of water companies. A study by Corporate Watch
(2013) found that companies are borrowing from subsidiaries of their owners, based
overseas at high rates of interest which is received tax free by the shareholders
because the loans are issued through the Channel Islands stock exchange as
“quoted Eurobonds.” These loans are often issued from off shore exchanges and so
the interest received is not taxable while interest payments reduce the tax liability of
the company.65 The companies cited by Corporate Watch are Northumbrian Water,
Yorkshire Water, Thames Water, Anglian Water and Southern Water. The 2013
accounts of the ultimate parent of Southern Water, Greensands Holdings Ltd, show
interest of £67.9m payable to the shareholders on loans of £633.9m (p.81). However,
this has been accrued rather than paid.66 The 2013 accounts of Thames Water Utility
Ltd (the regulated company) show that interest was paid to shareholders of £17.5m
(TWUL Annual Report 2013, p.75).
At the same time as companies have been increasing their debts, they have been
paying high dividends. High debts can lead to more returns to shareholders.
RiskMetrics (2008, p.7) cites investors in Thames, Macquarie: “the sustainable and
growing long term cash flows of infrastructure assets mean that infrastructure
assets can typically support more debt that other businesses which can increase
returns to shareholders. This indicates the importance of financial structuring and
capital optimisation in enhancing shareholder returns to owners of infrastructure
assets.” According to Armitage (2012, p.465), “Companies have paid out dividends
that have been substantially greater than their free cash flows whether measured
before or after interest payments. As a result companies have had to gear up to
65 “Eurobond tax scandal: Tax avoidance figure is just 'the tip of the iceberg’, Margaret Hodge tells
HMRC” The Independent, 28 October 2013.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eurobond-tax-scandal-tax-avoidance-figure-is-just-
the-tip-of-the-iceberg-margaret-hodge-tells-hmrc-8909553.html
66 Interview, Southern Water, January 2014.
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
meet their investment expenditure and dividend payments.” Allen and Pryke (2013,
p.426) cite evidence to show that Thames Water used an increase in debt to finance
dividend payments. Moody’s reported prior to a bond issue by Thames Water Utilities
Cayman Finance Limited that, “future debt issuance under the MTN Programme will
be principally for the purpose for finding TWUL’s [Thames Water Utilities Ltd] capital
expenditure programme, refinancing maturing debt and funding distributions to
shareholders.”67 Turner (2013) shows how Yorkshire Water increased gearing in
2006 which led to huge dividends being paid out to investors resulting in a return for
debt and equity investors of 24.1% in that year, and the returns increase to more
than 30% if the increase in share value is taken into account.
The takeover process can be associated with a hike in gearing and with dividend
payouts. For example, at the time of the takeover of Anglian Water in 2007, it was
reported that the company’s gearing was to increase “from around 78% up to a
maximum of 83% as a result of a dividend payment to the consortium members.”
Furthermore, “The dividend of £215m was paid to the consortium members by
Anglian Water on 7 March to facilitate achieving the increase in gearing” (Ofwat
2007b, p.5 emphasis added). This would seem to indicate that the increase in
borrowing is not in response to investment needs, but to finance distributions to
shareholders. The wording of this extract suggests a causality where dividends are
taken out with the objective of increasing gearing. Similarly, when Yorkshire Water
was sold for £3bn in November 2007,68 in the same year, a special dividend payment
was made of £717m as well as the normal dividend of £109m.69
Acquisition debt can also increase gearing at the time of a takeover. Yorkshire Water
transferred all its existing debt to a securitisation structure which incorporated
67 Moody’s Investor Service, Thames Water Utilities Cayman Finance Limited / Thames Water Utilities
Finance Limited, Pre-Sale Report, 10 August 2007.
68 http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/9/7/general/yorkshire-water-refinancing-nears-
completion.html
69 Annual Report 2008.
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some of the acquisition debt. The company then reported that they expected a
stepped increase in gearing over time from around 66% of debt to RCV to the
maximum permitted by the securitised structure of 85% after which they expected to
maintain a highly leveraged structure consistent with other water companies (Ofwat
2009b). When Northumbrian Water was taken over, the acquisition was financed with
£232m of new debt which was transferred to Northumbrian Water Ltd and increased
their gearing from 56% to 62% (Ofwat 2011e). When Thames was taken over, all the
existing debt of Thames Water Utilities Ltd was transferred into a securitisation
structure and some acquisition debt was to be refinanced also within this structure:
“The first drawdown of £900m is intended to refinance certain acquisition debt.”70
Over the past five years, companies have often paid more in dividends than they
made in profits. Figure 6 shows the total profit after tax and dividend payments of
England’s nine water and sewerage companies for the past five years. For six of
these (Anglian, Northumbrian, Thames, United Utilities, Wessex and Yorkshire
Water), cumulative dividend payouts have exceeded after-tax profit over the five-year
period. Companies are paying out more than their profits so equity is declining. This
is not sustainable in the long term.
Fig 6: Total profit after tax and dividends paid 2009-2013 (£m)
70 http://www.linklaters.com/News/LatestDeals/2007/Pages/3302.aspx
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from company annual reports
Armitage (2012) finds that the practice of high dividend payments occurs across the
sector, and all the water companies have behaved in a similar manner. Each has
paid out consistently large amounts in relation to their profits and especially in
relation to their cash flows. Even ignoring the special dividends, all the companies
have paid regular dividends that were substantially greater than their available cash
flows after interest. Armitage (2012) reviews the evidence to assess the reason for
such consistently high dividend payouts and concludes that high payments are
expected by shareholders while managers “may just cater to, or even be forced by
proxy vote to meet, extreme investor demands” (p.487, citing Baker and Wurgler
2004a). Measures to align the interests of managers and investors are discussed in
the next section.
Certainly, the other reasons considered by Armitage (such as agency costs) offer
little explanation but he fails to consider why shareholders would make such
extreme demands on corporate finances. Given that there are no regulatory
constraints on dividend payouts, beyond maintaining the financial ratios required to
keep the company’s credit rating intact, owners have an incentive to seek as high
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dividends as they can within the regulatory boundary of the need for investment
grade credit rating. Private equity owners, operating in global markets can make
more use of their capital by extracting as much as possible from water companies to
finance other investments. For these investors, the English water companies are just
a small part of an extensive investment portfolio. By stretching their balance sheets
to the limit, increasing borrowing to a point where they stay just within investment
grade boundaries, they are able to increase their global wealth further.
6.5 Is high gearing a problem?
For Ofwat, it is up to companies to determine how they want to structure themselves
with regard to debt and equity. The regulator does not want to intervene to prevent
any such ‘”market-led structures” (Ofwat 2011b, p. 38), although they have modified
the licences of highly-geared firms with ring-fencing provisions to provide assurance
that the companies will be able to finance their regulated activities. Some have
called for more intervention by Ofwat such as explicit credit and liquidity thresholds
in company licences. However, as mentioned earlier, Ofwat’s position is that such
interventions would undermine the ethos of incentive-based regulation.
Furthermore, while Ofwat is aware of the potential threats posed by high gearing
(less flexibility and greater vulnerability to cost shocks than traditionally structured
companies), it is not clear that they would be able to do a better job of assessing
potential for future financial failure than the companies themselves, together with
the credit ratings agencies which is why they have not intervened (Ofwat 2011b,
p.38).
Rather than being alarmed by the rapid increase in gearing, Ofwat sees this as
evidence of the strength of the regulatory regime, demonstrating a high level of
confidence in the sector: “Stakeholders have acknowledged this stable and
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transparent regulatory framework as a factor that has allowed the companies to
sustain a relatively high level of gearing, but still maintain investment grade credit
ratings” (Ofwat 2011b p.37). Ofwat also sees that high gearing can bring benefits for
consumers. If capital restructuring leads to lower tax payments these benefits are
expected to be passed to customers at the next price review (Ofwat 2007b, p5; Ofwat
2011b, p40).
High gearing is less of a problem in the UK regulated water sector than elsewhere.
This is because the risk profile is so low that investment grade ratings are consistent
with a degree of leverage that would be inconceivable for most other industries.
Cash flows are highly predictable and regulated UK utilities are seen as a safe haven
next to the turmoil of the Euro area (Moody’s 2012a, p.11). There is no competition,
consumers have to have water, and the policy regime has been generous to
investors. According to Armitage (2012, p.489) “Shareholders would not expect most
companies to gear up persistently in order to pay their dividends, only those
companies which are well suited to do so. The water companies were unusually well
suited because of their low business risk, their lack of opportunities for investment
beyond the investment agreed by Ofwat and because they started life with no debt.”
It has been suggested that the risk of investment in UK water is further lowered
because of a perception that companies would be rescued by the state in the event of
financial difficulties. Research by Severn Trent and National Grid (2012) found that
investors in water and energy are likely to assume that companies will be bailed out
in the case of financial distress and this leads them to excessive debt levels. In their
survey they found that equity investors believed that investors in a highly geared
company did not bear the full risk. Furthermore, the debt itself could protect firms
against tighter regulation. According to Bloomberg Businessweek: “The debt
mountain at UK water companies is their best defence against politicians seeking to
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cut the cost of living.”71 Research by OXERA, cited in Turner (2013, p.48), also
indicates that “a significant number of investors believed that if companies took on
more debt the regulator would be less likely to take action against them as action
would be more likely to lead to the company experiencing financial difficulty.” These
findings would seem to indicate that there is a perception in some parts of the sector
that high debts offer a form of protection for investors, implying that water
companies have an element of “too big to fail” which creates moral hazard where
companies do not see that they bear the full risk of highly leveraged financing
structures.
6.6 Costs of gearing
Despite the efforts of Ofwat to maintain financeability, credit ratings have declined
since the 1990s. Although there is some variation in the sector, companies are
clustered around a credit rating of BBB+ which represents a fall from the average
credit rating of AA- in the mid-1990s (Ofwat 2011b, p.19). This decline in ratings
correlates directly with the increased levels of debt (Table 3). While gearing has
increased, levels are considered to have reached a steady state at the point at which
ratings are just within investment grade as required by the regulator.72 UK water
utilities are not expecting to pay down their debt from revenues so long as the base
value of regulated assets is maintained or growing. They need to manage their debt
repayments to reduce exposure. Maturing debt is generally expected to be
refinanced by new borrowings as it falls due.
There are clear tensions between the efforts of the regulator to maintain a
regulatory environment that is conducive to financeability at the same time as firms
are stretching their balance sheets to the limit to take out debt which lowers the
71 “Debts Keep Water Firms Off-Limits for Politicians: UK Credit” Bloomberg News, 18 October 2013
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-18/debts-keep-water-firms-off-limits-for-politicians-
u-dot-k-dot-credit
72 Interview, Moody’s, November 2013.
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credit rating. Highly leveraged firms are less able to withstand shocks and their
financing structure is less flexible. Companies may struggle in response to the
current price review. The WACC on which price controls are based is expected to be
lower in the next price period (PR14) in part because Ofwat will revise their expected
gearing levels upward. For firms that are highly indebted, this may lower their
interest rate cover ratio which is a key indicator for ratings agencies. Highly
leveraged companies may have to inject equity to maintain a financial profile in line
with guidance for specific rating categories. However, the private equity ownership
structure is attractive to the financial sector because of its closed ownership.
Increasing equity through share issues is unlikely to be a viable strategy (Turner
2013) which leaves increasing equity through retained earnings (and lower
dividends) as the only available option.
Moody’s have indicated that a reduction in the allowed cost of capital by Ofwat in the
2014 price review to a level that was significantly below that proposed by companies
would be ‘credit negative’. The listed companies United Utilities and Severn Trent
would remain strongly positioned but the highly leveraged companies (including
Anglian Water, Thames Water, Yorkshire Water and Southern Water) “would face
negative ratings pressure if management and shareholders are unable to implement
balance-sheet strengthening measures in the face of a challenging price review.”73
Negative ratings lead to increases in financing costs.
The sector is financed by payments of customer bills. The distributional impact of
high borrowing depends on how the loan finance is used. The securitisation
structure means that loans are taken out on the strength of future payments by
consumers. Increasing debt is essentially a transfer from the consumers of the
future to today’s water providers. If this is invested in long-term infrastructure which
will be used to provide services in the future, this may be an equitable redistribution.
73 “Moody’s says Ofwat’s PR14 changes are credit negative for the UK water sector” waterbriefing.org
23rd December 2013
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However, if this is used to fund transfers to shareholders via excessive interest and
dividends, this is regressive. Lower dividend and interest payments could be used to
reduce customer bills directly and a lower gearing level would improve credit
ratings, resulting in lower capital costs which would further reduce the burden on
end users.
High debt levels constrain the ability of companies to borrow further which creates
challenges where infrastructure investment is needed. Thames Water in particular
has come in for considerable criticism for its high dividend payouts coupled with
requests to increase customer prices. In order to finance investment in a new sewer
infrastructure (the Thames Tideway Tunnel) at a cost of around £4.1bn, Thames
plans to increase household bills in the region of £70 to £80 a year.74 In 2013, the
company put forward a request for a price increase to finance new investment while
over the past five years, the company has paid £1.3bn in dividends. The company’s
increase in debt has not been associated with any change in the value of the
company and now the increase in investment required can only take place with an
increase in household bills: “the private sector capital that was supposed to be made
available for the renewal of London and the South-East’s ageing water
infrastructure which now consists largely of a mound of leveraged debt, to put it
bluntly, appears to have been used to benefit investors at the expense of households
and, indirectly, their rising water bills” (Allen and Pryke 2013, p.432).
7 Changes in company costs: Interest, management and labour
Water companies’ spending patterns have changed in the past two decades. There
has been a substantial increase in the proportion of turnover allocated to interest
payments and to directors’ remuneration while the proportion going to salaries and
74 http://www.thamestidewaytunnel.co.uk/doclib/p2-funding-how-the-project-will-be-paid-for/
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wages has declined. This is consistent with other studies of the impact of
financialisation on the labour share of income (Dünhaupt 2013; Rossman and
Greenfield 2006).
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Table 5: Average % of turnover for the England WaSCs75
1993 2003 2013
Directors' remuneration/
Turnover 0.1318 0.1302 0.2052
Salaries and wages/turnover 15.37 11.38 10.22
Interest payable/turnover 4.61 14.37 19.50
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Company Annual Reports, various years
For each of the nine WASCs in England, the proportion of turnover allocated to each
of these three account headings was calculated at ten-year intervals and then
changes in the allocation were compared over time. The (unweighted) average
across the nine WaSCs is shown in table 5. Over the past twenty years, the
proportion of turnover allocated to directors’ remuneration increased by 56%, all of
which has been since 2003. This allocation declined slightly in the ten years to 2003.
At the same time, the proportion of income allocated to salaries and wages has
declined by over 30%, from around 15% of turnover in 1993 to 10% in 2013.
Meanwhile, interest payments have soared over the period, accounting for nearly
20% of turnover in 2013 compared with just 5% in 1993.
The regulatory structure combined with pressure from shareholders has brought
down wage costs, and such reductions are considered to be evidence of an increase
in efficiency. However, interest payments, which have increased substantially, are
not judged on the same terms. Arguably the high interest payments made by water
companies are as inefficient as a high wage bill but they are not treated as such and
they are outside the remit of the regulator. In addition, company performance is
often assessed by the operating profit or the EBITDA (earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortisation) so a company with low operating costs but
75 Thames, Severn Trent, United Utilities, Yorkshire, Anglian, Southern, South West, Wessex,
Northumbrian.
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
high interest payments is considered to be efficient. Allocations to the financial
sector go unchecked but payments to employees face downward pressure.
The data indicate a growing gap between payments to directors and expenditure on
salaries and wages. Table 6 shows the ratio of the average remuneration of the
highest paid director for the nine companies compared with the average wage (also
averaged across the companies at ten year intervals).
Table 6: Ratio of average wage to remuneration of highest paid director (£000)
1993 2003 2013
Highest paid director 120.5 245.8 981.6
Average Wage76 17.8 25.1 33.1
Ratio 6.8 9.8 29.6
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Company Annual Reports, various years
The table shows that in 1993 the remuneration of the highest paid director was in the
region of 7 times the average wage but, by 2013, this ratio had risen to almost 30
times reflecting a widening gulf between payments to senior executives and the
employees in the sector.
Downward pressure on wages comes from both shareholders seeking high returns
and from targets set by the regulator. There is, then, every incentive for firms to
seek to reduce employment costs which may affect pension costs, training and
numbers employed.77 Several companies reported that they would need to lay off
staff as a result of the price review process in 2004.78
76 Calculated as total salaries and wages divided by number of employees for each company.
77 Interview, UNISON, December 2013.
78 For example, in the 2005 Annual Report of Severn Trent it was reported that following Ofwat’s price
determination, “manpower efficiencies of up to 350 posts” would be achieved over the 5-year
regulatory period (p.12). Similarly Anglian Water in their 2005 Annual Report cite redundancies as a
factor which will help the company to achieve the regulator’s efficiency targets: “Of these savings [of
£12m per annum] approximately £10 million per annum will contribute to reduced operating costs for
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While there is downward pressure on employment costs, payments to directors have
increased substantially. Table 7 shows the emoluments of the highest paid directors
for the nine WaSCs in England.
Table 7: Remuneration of highest paid director (£000)
2013
United Utilities 2,000
Severn Trent Water 1,338
Anglian Water 1,332
Yorkshire Water 1,091
Thames Water 993
Southern Water 632
South West Water 499
Wessex Water 487
Northumbrian Water 462
Average 982
Average 2003* 246
Average 1993* 121
Source: Author’s calculations and company reports
*2013 prices
manpower (the remaining annual savings will be realised in capital expenditure). The reduction in
manpower costs and other identified initiatives will generate a significant proportion of the total
operating efficiency savings required by the regulatory settlement in the AMP4.”78 In their 2005
Annual Report South West Water reports (p.3): “The additional efficiencies required over the K4
regulatory period (2005-2010) include a £13m per annum reduction in base operating costs by 2010
and the company has already implemented a number of reorganizational and restructuring initiatives
in order to attain the demanding efficiency targets imposed, including a manpower reduction
programme which will see employee levels reduced by 100 over the period.” Even the not-for-profit
Welsh Water states that they will achieve the efficiency targets set by Ofwat by “headcount reduction”
among other measures.
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The table shows that in the past twenty years, the average remuneration of the
highest paid director has increased from £121,000 to £982,000 in real terms. The
increase has been particularly marked in the past ten years. The highest paid
director is at United Utilities with total remuneration of around £2m in 2013.
A large proportion of directors’ earnings are based on bonus payments, and these
are usually contingent on achieving targets which are established to align the
interests of directors with those of shareholders. Severn Trent, for example, sets
targets for directors with the express purpose of aligning directors’ and
shareholders’ interests.79 Thames pays a maximum award of 112.5% of base salary
in the form of an annual bonus which is structured to “reward significant
improvement in the Group’s financial and operational performance” (Annual Report
2013, p. 48). The directors of the LSE-listed firms receive part of their remuneration
in the form of company shares so they have a personal financial interest in the
performance of the firm.80 Northumbrian Water in their 2013 accounts (p.61) provide
details of the Annual Bonus for directors which is based on a series of targets. Fifty
percent of the bonus relies on meeting financial targets. Finally, when the Chief
Executive left Anglian Water in 2010 (to join Ofwat) he was awarded a severance
payment of £10m which was justified on the basis of the gains to shareholders. When
he joined, the share price was 525p per share, and three years later the company
was sold for 1578p per share.81 The huge increase in directors’ remuneration would
seem to be associated with a shifting dynamic which does not just amount to a
financial incentive but provides a way of measuring worth. Together with bonus
79 Severn Trent Annual Report 2013, p.60.
80 United Utilities Plc, for example, has a “deferred bonus plan” where 50% of a director’s gross
bonus is deferred into company shares for three years. They say that this “aligns the interests of
executives and shareholders through the delivery of an award in shares” (United Utilities Plc Annual
Report 2013, p.58).
81 “Anglian Water chief ‘was worth’ reported £10m severance” Huntspost 24, 19 November 2010.
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payments, directors are largely evaluated on the gains in shareholder value which
feeds into the culture of the industry.82
Developments in the water sector echo those of the wider economy where real
wages are falling and payments to directors are increasing. The Office of National
Statistics reports that in real terms the average earnings of UK employees in 2012
had fallen to roughly 2003 levels (Levy 2013). Calculations by the Trades Union
Congress show directors’ pay rising seven times faster than average wages.83
Research by Unison shows that Chief Executive pay in the FTSE 100 companies has
increased from 40 times average workers earnings in 1998 to 120 times in 2013.84
The trends in the remuneration structure of water companies is in line with common
practice in the private sector. The regulator may see these developments in the cost
structure as market outcomes. But rather than a gain in efficiency, the systemic
changes in allocations outlined above indicate that some agents are gaining and
some are losing, and these settlements derive from the parameters established in a
regulatory process which supports the needs of some more than others. The sop
approach sees the shift in allocation from labour (and other operating expenses) to
directors and the financial sector in terms of relations between agents. This is not so
much a market outcome as the result of the contestation between agents with
conflicting agendas.
The reduction in the share of turnover allocated to labour costs is consistent with the
objectives of privatisation which included a weakening of trade union power (Kay and
Thompson 1986). This has been achieved to some degree by the privatisation
process which created a fragmented structure so that each company negotiates
terms and conditions with staff, even though these are represented by national trade
82 Further research is required to learn more about the role of directors and the proportion devoted to
financial management.
83http://www.tuc.org.uk/economic-issues/directors-pay-rising-seven-times-faster-average-wages
84 http://www.unison.org.uk/news/richest-uk-bosses-just-got-richer
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unions (GMB and UNISON). Terms and conditions vary considerably across the
country.85 Furthermore, labour is not regarded as a stakeholder in the sector in the
same way as investors or consumers. Ofwat does not formally consult with trade
unions in policy design nor in the Price Review process although representations are
made by UNISON and GMB.
One person’s efficiency gain can be another’s exploitation. More research is needed
to determine the extent to which cuts in operating costs have affected the terms and
conditions of workers. A survey by GMB of 9,000 water company employees has
found that workers are experiencing high levels of stress, and this was particularly
noticeable in Thames Water. Workers employed by Welsh Water and Scottish Water
scored significantly lower in terms of stress levels, job insecurity and pensions’
concerns. Workers in these companies were also far less likely to see cost-cutting
and lack of investment as adversely affecting customer service. 86
8 Outcomes
The UK water sector has consistently provided high quality water largely without
interruption since privatisation. The quality of water on the nation’s beaches has
greatly improved. However, concerns remain regarding affordability, equity and
accountability.
8.1 Affordability and equity
The sector’s revenue is virtually entirely financed by bills paid by customers. There
are no state subsidies. When the private sector provides investment, this is all repaid
– and the interest and the costs of consultants etc - by revenue from bills paid by
users. Furthermore, water is essential and monopolistic so customers have no
85 Interview with GMB.
86 GMB Press Release January 2013, http://www.gmb.org.uk/newsroom/gmb-water-workers-seek-
changes
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choice but to pay their bill (or default on payment). For most customers, their only
involvement in the water sector is in paying their water bills.
Average water bills have three key components (Ofwat 2011b): operating costs;
capital charges (including infrastructure renewals and current cost depreciation);
and return on capital (including interest payments, dividends and tax and described
as “that part of the revenue requirement that provides the returns necessary to
remunerate debt and equity investors” (Ofwat 2011b, p.9)). For the 2010-15 price
allocation, the revenue from customer bills is distributed as set out in Table 8.
Table 8: Allocation of revenue from customer bills (%)
Operating Costs 38.6
Infrastructure renewals 8.5
Current cost depreciation 23.1
Return on capital 26.8
Tax 3.0
Source: Ofwat 2011a, p.8, Ofwat 2011b, p.9
Table 8 shows that nearly 27% of the customer bill for water goes to pay for “return
on capital.” Given that the average household bill is £360 and there are around
22.5m households in England, if 26.8% of each bill goes to financial costs, this
indicates a total transfer to the financial sector of more than £2bn per annum and
this is without including industrial consumers. This is just to pay for the financing
costs and not for any physical investment. The water sector generates a substantial
transfer of revenue from households to finance.
At the other end of the sop from the dividend and interest payments to the financial
sector, households are finding it more difficult to pay their bills. Figure 7 shows the
average household water bill since 1990. Following a steady rise, there was a
reduction after the 1999 price review and steady climb since then, reaching a plateau
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from 2009. Average household bills have increased by 40% in real terms since
privatisation (NAO 2013b).
Fig 7: Average household water bill
Source: Ofwat 2009a. The figures from 2010 onwards are projections using the price limits set for
these years in the 2009 price review.
Over the past ten years, bills have increased faster than overall prices and more
than household incomes. In 2013, real wages fell to slightly below their level in 2003.
Household water bills increased from £286 to £340 over the same period. These
diverging trends are shown in Figure 8.
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Fig 8: Average earnings and household bills (in real terms)87
Sources: Earnings, Levy (2013); water bills, Ofwat 2009a)
Measures of affordability of water typically are based on the proportion of household
income that is spent on water and sewerage. Affordability risks arise when a
household spends more than 5% of their disposable income on these bills (Ofwat
2011g).88 In 2011-12, 12% of households in the UK spent more than 5% of their
income on water and sewerage bills compared with 8% of households in 2002/03
(NAO 2013b) indicating that affordability is falling. Those that have trouble paying for
87 2012 prices for earnings and 2009 prices for water and water prices are based on those set in 2009
for the next five years.
88 According to the United Nations it was agreed when access to water became recognised as a
human right in July 2010, that water facilities and services must be affordable for all. The United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggests that water costs should not exceed 3% of
household income - http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml
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water are, on the whole, the poorest and there is a statistically significant
relationship between debt and deprivation (Ofwat 2011g, p.27). Ofwat reports that
90% of households who spend more than 5% of their income on their water and
sewerage bills (2.2 million households) have an income of below £160 a week (or
£8,000 a year). Huby and Bradshaw (2012) find that those who are classified as water
poor are more likely to be lone parents, more likely to be in receipt of benefits, and
more likely to live in a household without a meter.
The majority of households are unmetered and receive a flat-rate bill based on the
rateable value of their property, but the sector is in a state of transition with a move
to increase the proportion of metered households. In 2010 around 37% of
households had meters. The shift to metering is optional for most households except
in water-stressed areas. According to Ofwat, metering is supposed to use price
signals to lower water use, as metered charges provide a clear financial incentive for
customers to use less water. Research from the water industry is cited to show that
customers reduce their water use when they have a meter, and research reportedly
shows that “customers regard metered charges as the fairest way to pay for water,
particularly if everyone has a meter” (Ofwat 2011f, p.13). However, the strategy of
allocating infrastructure costs across all customers through the metered pricing
mechanism can be regressive. According to a study by the National Audit Office, the
policy of financing infrastructure investment via household bills (which is the case
for water and energy investment) is more regressive than taxation as it requires
proportionately greater expenditure from those on low incomes (NAO 2013b).
The relationship with meters is not straightforward. There are winners and losers.
The switch to metering, with charges based on consumption rather than a flat rate
based on property value, is likely to benefit small households in properties with high
rateable value. Large households in low value housing are likely to lose out. Such
households are not necessarily on low incomes but families with three or more
children are over-represented among families experiencing, or at risk of, relative
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income poverty (DWP 2011). The decision to opt for a water meter appears not to be
based on simple economic rationality. Households sometimes prefer the regularity
of a fixed price bill even if it is higher. There may be suspicion of a water company
that is offering to install a water meter.89
Low-income households are often less ‘active’ consumers, meaning that they may
be excluded from the best deals and are less proactive in terms of the way that they
deal with the switch from flat-rate to metering tariffs. There seems to be evidence
that a large number of households that could benefit from switching to water
metering do not do so, and this appears to contribute to the prevalence of water
poverty, especially among single-adult households (Hirsch 2013, p.25). When
customers switch to a water meter, this pushes up the price for the remaining
unmetered customers. According to Ofwat (2011f, p15) “some unmetered customers
are paying bills that are high relative to their own water use.” This contributes to a
cross-subsidy from less active and on average worse-off groups to more active and
on average better-off groups.
Bad debts in the sector due to non-payment of water bills have been increasing, and
these are now estimated to add about £15 to each household bill on average (DEFRA
2011). The amount of bad debt in the water sector has been rising at a significantly
faster rate than for other utilities and is more than three times that of the energy
sector even though energy bills are three times higher (Ofwat 2011g). There is
considerable evidence to indicate that, on the whole, those that do not pay their bills
are poorer households.
Customers in debt to their water company were more likely to: live in areas
associated, with incomes below £20,000, and be earning less than £10,000 a year,
have a significant other debt and a history of being in debt (for example owing more
89 Interview, Consumer Council for Water, September 2013.
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than £10,000 and having a County Court Judgement); have worse than average credit
risk scores; have recently relocated; be aged 25 to 45 years and be single. Ofwat
concludes (2011f, p.28): “income levels appear to be an important risk factor for
water debt.” Furthermore, almost all of the companies in England and Wales have
indicated to Ofwat that the economic recession has had a significant impact on levels
of customer water debt. Over the past decade, calls to National Debtline related to
difficulties paying water bills increased from 597 in 2003 to an estimated 22,870 for
2013 (2013 figure pro rata based on data for first 8 months of the year).90 This
suggests that customers with water debts are facing increasing hardship and are
concerned about bill payments so the picture is more complex than a ‘refusal to
pay.’
Water is not categorised as a priority debt (unlike, for example, housing costs,
energy bills and council tax).91 Since 1999, water companies have been banned from
disconnecting customers that fail to pay their water and sewerage bill. According to
DEFRA, bad debts are a problem “because households cannot be disconnected if
they do not pay their bills” suggesting a causal relationship (DEFRA 2011, p.8).
However, the link is not clear-cut. Franceys (2008, p. 191) cites research by Accent
Marketing and Research which found that customers with water debt typically have
multiple debts and are continually juggling bills trying to decide which to pay next
and how much. The study did not find that the ban on disconnection had an impact. In
fact, most customers were convinced that they could be disconnected for not paying
their water bill (Franceys 2008).
There is limited financial support for those who struggle to pay. Around 95,000
customers in England and Wales are on the WaterSure tariff, which allows certain
customers with water meters to have their bills capped at the annual average bill for
90 Email correspondence with National Debtline, November 2013.
91 Interview, Citizens Advice Bureau, October 2013.
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the company. However, the eligibility criteria are restrictive92 and this is a small
proportion of the 2.2 million households that pay more than 5% of their income on
water bills (cited above). Until 2010, the terms of companies’ licences prevented
them from exercising “undue discrimination” between customers, and this was
interpreted as a ban on any kind of cross-subsidy for poorer households. Section 44
of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 addressed this issue by enabling water
and sewerage undertakers to include social tariffs in their charges schemes. They
are now able to reduce charges for individuals who would otherwise have difficulty
paying their bill in full. DEFRA takes the view that this is better managed by
companies at the local level so they can take can take account of local
circumstances, needs and the views of their customers (DEFRA 2012b).
However there are restrictions. First, the social tariff has to be “cost-neutral” which
means that the revenue that a company loses by offering a social tariff needs to be
balanced by the reductions in costs that it experiences from the introduction of the
social tariff. Cost reductions might include a fall in debt recovery costs. There is no
rebalancing or cross-subsidy allowed and there is no compensation for companies
(Ofwat 2011d, p.4). Second, the cross-subsidy to support disadvantaged households
also has to be acceptable to the customers that pay for it. A social tariff requires the
consensus of the households who will be financing it (DEFRA 2012b, p.6). According
to DEFRA “The key test is that the proposed level of cross-subsidy should have broad
customer acceptability.” The Government’s view is that a charge of up to 1.5% of the
average annual household water and sewerage bill across England would be a
reasonable amount of cross-subsidy to expect non-qualifying households to provide
under a company social tariff but this figure is “offered as a broad indicator rather
92 To qualify, households have to be metered, in receipt of qualifying means-tested benefits or tax
credits and have three or more children living at home under the age of nineteen, or somebody in the
household with a medical condition which necessitates a high essential use of water. This is funded
entirely by a cross-subsidy from other water consumers. On average it adds about £0.49 per year to
the bills of non-eligible households (DEFRA 2012a). Water UK press release 2.11.13.
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than a cap” (DEFRA 2012a, p.8). This is part of the wider initiative to increase
customer engagement in monitoring water company activities.
The picture, then, is one of rising bills and falling incomes with increasing numbers
of the most deprived struggling to pay their water bills. Social policy has been
devolved from the state to water companies and their customers. Affordable water is
not seen as a human right but, firstly, rests on whether support for poorer
households costs less than the costs of non-payment and, secondly, depends on the
benevolence of water companies and other customers who need to approve social
tariffs and bring in charitable provisions.
The language of the sector is harsh towards those that fail to pay their water bills.
For example, “We remain of the view that it is unacceptable for honest customers to
be forced to subsidise those who refuse to pay their water bills” (House of Commons
2013, p. 24). A press release from the Environment Secretary, Owen Paterson called
for “a crackdown on bad debt with the industry’s worst performers challenged to
match the performance of the best.”93 Ofwat brought out a paper in 2010 titled – “A
drain on society – what can be done about water debt?” (Ofwat 2010c).
The sop approach aims to link consumption and production in the wider socio-
economic context. Consumers are at one end of a financial process that links into
the production of water. At the other end lie the financial investors that have stakes
in the companies that own water companies with many intermediaries along the way
including company directors. The previous sections showed that vast sums are being
paid in interest while complex financial mechanisms make it difficult to track the
flows of funds in corporate structures before they reach their offshore owners,
largely untaxed. These activities continue unchecked as long as the water company
can continue to carry out its functions. There seems to be a bias in a regulatory
93 “Action on affordable water bills” Press Release, Rt Hon Owen Paterson MP
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/action-on-affordable-water-bills
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framework that comes down heavily on the poorest households while the financial
engineering of wealthy investors is ignored. This is not to argue that households
should not pay their bills but rather that the issue of payment needs to be considered
in the context of the entire cost structure of the industry to determine if this is a fair
distributional outcome.
8.2 Accountability
There has been a policy shift recently to place greater emphasis on the views and
needs of consumers. There is a sense that, if customers are going to have to pay for
investment, then they need to be consulted. For example, in the Walker Review on
customer charges, it is stressed that “if water customers are to pay for these
improvements, it is vitally important that they are consulted on the additional costs
before governments agree to them - or water prices will begin to be seen as a
‘stealth tax’ and face real opposition, as has already occurred in the South West”
(DEFRA 2009).
Ofwat is required to “incentivise companies to … increase the quality and
responsiveness of their customer service” (DEFRA 2013, p.24.). In 2006, the
Consumer Council for Water (CCW) was established to promote the interests of
domestic and business consumers in England and Wales. CCW holds regular
consultations to ensure that they are active in the areas that are of most relevance
and concern to end-users. They list their priorities for 2013 to 2016 as follows (CCW
2013):
 Value for money with fair and affordable charges;
 Improving customer service to reduce complaints;
 Safe, reliable good quality water;
 Sustainable sewerage with minimal sewer flooding; and
 Speaking up for water customers.
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CCW makes representations on behalf of end users and makes statements to the
press on consumer issues. With support from the CCW, water companies have
appointed independent customer challenge groups (CCGs) made up of
representatives of local regulators and interest and consumer groups. Their role is
to challenge the quality of the water company’s customer engagement process and
to assess how well the company’s proposed outcomes and outcome delivery
incentives reflect its customer engagement and customers’ views and priorities. The
Southern Water CCG describes itself as a “critical friend” to the water company.94
Vulnerable customers would not be able to engage in the issues of water regulation
as they are far too complex and so need to rely on CCGs and experts to look after
their interests.95
The 2014 Price Review aims to take greater notice of the views of end users and
places considerable emphasis on the customer. According to Sonia Brown “the level
of expenditure should be undertaken based on what the customer wants” and later
the company “could cut its bills if that is what its customers want, given the margin
available” (Ofwat 2013, p.16). The CCGs are required to approve the company’s
business plan. In their review of the business plan by Southern Water, the CCG
identifies six customer priorities – responsive customer services; a constant supply
of high quality drinking water; removing wastewater effectively; looking after the
environment; better information and advice and affordable bills (SWCCG 2013). The
expansion of competition in 2017 is also intended to make water companies more
customer-responsive.
However, increasing the role of customers in shaping the activities of water
companies faces constraints. First, despite efforts to engage and inform customers,
research often finds that most customers have little awareness of the governance
system and not much engagement with their water company beyond paying their
94 Interview, Southern Water Customer Challenge Group, November 2013.
95 Interview, Citizens Advice Bureau, October 2013.
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bills. Research commissioned by the CCW regarding the current price review
process found that most customers had little contact with their water company and
there was little awareness of Ofwat or CCW.96 Another study on consumer attitudes
to water, based on a series of workshops with water customers, found that most
respondents had no idea who owned their water company (many thought the owners
were French). The corporate structure was largely unknown, not a high priority for
respondents and was not felt to impact on perceptions of value for money (Creative
Research 2013). Possibly because water constitutes a small part of household
expenditure, supply is regular and of high quality, and there is no choice, consumers
do not appear to have much interest in having a greater involvement in making their
water companies more accountable.
Second, accountability is clouded by the density of the technical issues involved.
Customers are asked to engage with companies on the issues that are important to
them, and this often comes down to the delivery of a good service at a reasonable
price. But customers are unable to know what is a fair price. As the Southern Water
CCG points out in its report, it has challenged the shareholders to be more open and
transparent around the financial and tax affairs of the business. But when it comes
to whether or not the shareholders are making returns which are fair, they are not in
a position to judge: “the CCG is not the best body to answer this question” (SWCCG
2013, p.24). All the CCG can do is engage with consumers to see if the business plan
is acceptable but this does not necessarily justify the prices charged.
The CCW goes some way to promoting consumer interests within the technically
complex parameters. For example, they have conducted research which shows that
water company profits were raised by £720m in the two years between 2010 and
2012 due to the low interest rates and higher-than-expected inflation. Their research
indicates that water companies have “beaten profit assumptions by Ofwat … by
96 SPA Future Thinking ‘Threshold of Acceptability’ prepared for CCWater, July 2013,
http://www.ccwater.org.uk/upload/pdf/Threshold_of_Acceptability_Report_final.pdf
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
around 30 per cent in the past two years.”97 While CCW promotes the interests of
consumers, the latter are mostly unaware of their efforts. The nature of the water
sector is such that customers need to rely on the state and industry experts to look
after their interests.
Third, the consumer consultations only touch the surface of the sector. Many issues
are not referred to consumers. Customers are not, for example, asked to approve
payments to directors or dividend payments or hikes in gearing. On the website of
Southern Water, the ‘Investors’ Information’ page is password protected, saying
“The information contained in it is only available to certain current holders of
Southern Water Services (Finance) Limited bonds as debt creditors of Southern
Water Services (Finance) Limited, Southern Water (Greensands) plc or to investment
professionals.”98 Changes in ownership of the company take place without reference
to customers. Sales of stakes in Thames Water took place behind closed doors (see
above) and the price paid was not disclosed. As a result consumers and the
regulator cannot know how much revenue firms are making from holding stakes in
water companies.
In the water sector, consumers are largely passive agents in the sop for reasons
outlined above. Their engagement requires the impetus and support of state
initiatives (for example the establishing of CCW and CCGs with support from Ofwat)
but even then, their capacity to challenge the water providers is limited: first, by the
technical nature of the sector which has been accentuated with the opaque financial
structures that have been established; and, second, by the number of significant
factors (such as payments to directors and finance costs) which are beyond the
scope of customer engagement. As a result, despite efforts by the regulator to
create a more market-oriented framework where the firms have to respond to the
needs of consumers, this is only feasible to a superficial extent. Firms consult
97 “Water groups open coffers amid regulatory push to share profits” Financial Times 14 July 2013.
98 http://www.southernwater.co.uk/about-us/about-southern-water/investors/
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consumers on the issues which they say are important to them but consumers do
not know what the issues are, let alone understand them.
Paying for water is like paying a tax. There is no alternative and water has to be
consumed by everyone. Yet little is known about the ownership arrangements of
water providers, and firms are not held to account for their financing arrangements
beyond meeting the targets set for the delivery of the service. There are many
unknowns about the sector. The identity of the final recipients of distributions from
companies is unclear. The full cost of financial intermediaries is unknown. If
customers are to have a genuine say in the governance structure of the sector
beyond a token gesture then full disclosure of this information is required. It is
debateable whether, even with full disclosure, consumers would be able to grasp the
financial complexities of operations, let alone have an impact on outcomes.
9 Conclusion
The water sector in England and Wales has been transformed in the decades since
privatisation. Considerable investment has ensured that end users have access to a
regular supply of good quality water. Coastal waters are much cleaner. However,
prices have increased, more households are struggling to pay their bills, while
private owners have made considerable returns.
Ownership structures have evolved substantially since companies were listed on the
stock exchange in 1989. The financial sector is now deeply embedded in the
structure of water delivery in England and Wales. Finance is raised on international
capital markets. Complex financial transactions are commonplace, and some
companies are owned by financial firms. This paper indicates that the extent and
impact of financialisation is not a standard feature of privatisation but is related to
the nature of the company owners. Some water companies owned by private equity
finance have both subsidiaries and holding company owners based off shore. In
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some cases the ultimate owners are difficult to trace in part because they change as
ownership stakes are bought and sold. Financial engineering in some firms has led
to large increases in debt accompanied by substantial increases in payments of
interest and dividends. Such practices risk leaving firms unable to pay for future
investment without seeking to increase the price that they can charge customers.
The sop approach aims to locate consumption within distinct and distinctly
structured systems that are commodity-specific. The paper shows how consumers
and producers are linked in a regressive financial process. At one end of the sop,
customers are required to pay into the sector pool of funds and there is little choice
about this. These funds are used to pay for capital investment in the sector and to
cover financing costs including interest and dividend payments to shareholders.
Some companies are owned by investment funds operating on behalf of the world’s
richest investors. Indeed, Northumbrian Water is owned by a corporate group
controlled by the eighth richest person in the world. Along the way, fees are paid to
financial advisers, some based in offshore financial centres. The paper shows that
the tariffs paid by consumers reflect financial costs which have provided high
returns to private investors.
There is no need to travel far to look for more equitable alternatives. Welsh Water is
owned by a company limited by guarantee which distributes dividends to customers
or reinvests any profits made. The company has low gearing and a high credit rating.
However, the company still operates in a financialised structure which is to some
degree outside the scope of democratic accountability. Scottish Water, however, is
owned by the public sector. The company borrows from the state, and efficiency
levels match those of the privatized companies in England.99
99 Comparing the efficiency of Scotland with England it was found that (contrary to expectations)
“upon closer examination it appears that by 2006-07 … Scottish Water had already reduced its costs
to a level comparable with those in England and Wales” (Ofwat 2011h, p.37).
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The state is at the heart of the sop. The financialisation process has been shaped by
the nature of water and the regulatory environment, without which the securitisation
carried out by some firms would not be possible. While similar processes may be
observed in other sectors and locations, the specific nature of the securitisation
derives from the historically evolved structures and processes in England and
Wales. And the state shapes the distributional impact of sector financing. Measures
to support those who struggle to pay their bills are minimal compared with the
concessions made to allow transfers to wealthy owners. In large part the state is
constrained because there is little that can be done to limit the impact of
financialisation without rethinking the entire structure of the industry – which risks
damaging the confidence of investors in UK Plc.
Things are changing in the sector. The current price review (PR14) looks set to be
more demanding on water companies than previous reviews. The regulator is
consulting opinion on how to protect water providers from activities of companies in
the wider corporate structure, and the water White Paper is set to require firms to
separate their retail and wholesale activities. However, for these measures to make
a significant dent in the structural inequality of the sop, investors will need to see
their revenues fall, in which case they may decide they can make higher returns
elsewhere.
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